Belarus Security Update – 01 – 07 January 2024
A summary of key political-military events in Belarus
BLUF
The Belarusian Armed Forces did not change their posture last week.
Executive summary
Last week brought no noteworthy developments impacting the military-political situation in Belarus.
Due to the Christmas of the Eastern Orthodox Church (celebrated on 07JAN), the general activity of the Belarusian Armed Forces and their leadership representatives was low.
Nevertheless, presumably due to the end of Belarusian chairmanship in the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the subsequent start of the new year, personnel changes among Belarusian officials in the Joint CSTO Staff took place.
The overall training tempo remained below the average. However, visible intensification of military drills occurred later in the week – directly before the Christmas holidays. It was timely correlated with several inspections to check the readiness of duty subunits.
Elements of the Russian Armed Forces in Belarus presented almost no activity. That said, it is important to note information about the Russian Rosgvardia leadership’s visit to Belarus in late DEC2023.
On the other hand, mercenaries of the Wagner PMC continued their training actions with members of Belarusian Internal Troops and service members of the Belarusian Armed Forces. What is more, they likely even participated in firing classes dedicated to local Belarusian authorities.
Military developments
01-05JAN2024 – The various activities of Belarusian military representatives
On Monday (01JAN), the Head of the International Military Cooperation Department (IMCD), Col. Valery Revenko, provided general details related to the international activity of the IMCD in 2023.
According to him, IMCD had held 623 events and actively cooperated with China, Cuba, India, Iran, Vietnam, the United Arab Emirates, and 18 other countries. He mentioned that IMCD had participated in tasks related to the Belarusian chairmanship in the CSTO and its joining process in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Belarus had also fulfilled its obligations linked to international arms control and had organised 40 meetings with 19 foreign military attaches (from 14 countries). Officers of the International Military Cooperation Department had signed three international agreements (unspecified) and had translated “hundreds of documents” related to the genocide of the Belarusian people during WWII. The Head of the IMCD noted that Belarus was open to cooperation based on an equal and respectful attitude. He added that eight of the 31 foreign military attaches accredited in Belarus were representatives of NATO countries.
Referring to the future, Revenko informed that IMCD officers would participate in 802 international events in 2024 (more than a 25% increase) and would “achieve a breakthrough in relations with countries of the African continent, Latin America, East, South-East, and South-West Asia”.
Four days later (05JAN), the Commander of the Western Operational Command (OC), Col. Vladimir Bely, decided on the participation of selected service members of his forces in the international army games ‘Army-2024’.
03-04JAN2024 – New Belarusian military representatives in the CSTO
With the start of 2024, Kazakhstan replaced Belarus as the chairman country of the CSTO. This event likely triggered personnel changes among the Joint CSTO Staff, which also affected the Belarusian side.
On Wednesday (03JAN), Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko relieved Maj. Gen. Viktor Lisovsky, who served as a Deputy Chief of the Joint CSTO Staff.
A day later (04JAN), Lukashenko appointed two new officials to represent Belarus in the main military body of the CSTO. Maj. Gen. (reserve) Sergey Zaitsev became the Head of the Military Security Problems Directorate
Military exercises
01-04JAN2024 – The training activity of the Belarusian Air Force and Air Defence Forces
Over the past seven days, the training efforts of the Belarusian Air Force and Air Defence Forces remained minimal.
On Monday (01JAN), two Mi-24 helicopters departed from the 50th Mixed Aviation Base (Machulischy). One of them arrived at the 116th Assault Aviation Base (Lida).
A day later (02JAN), another Mi-24 took off from Machulischy.
On Thursday (04JAN), two more helicopters left the 50th Mixed Aviation Base. This refers to one Mi-24 and a Mi-8.
04JAN2024 – The training activity of the centrally subordinated formations
Last week, only a single training event engaging servicemen of the centrally subordinated formations was reported.
It pertains to the joint 50-kilometre training march summarising an additional training of military drivers of the Minsk Military Commandant’s Office and Belarusian Military Academy held on Thursday (04JAN).
04JAN2024 – The training activity of the North-Western Operational Command
The forces subordinated to the North-Western OC presented a minor training tempo for another week.
Only one training activity was reported. On Thursday (04JAN), several riflemen, machine gunners and snipers of the 120th Mechanised Brigade participated in a training gathering at the Uruchcha Training Ground. The event involved fire training but also included first aid and tactical medicine elements.
04-05JAN2024 – The training activity of the Belarusian Special Operation Forces
Over the past seven days, the formations of the Belarusian SOF were also not particularly active.
However, it is essential to note that on Thursday (04JAN), the training gathering dedicated to snipers from various military formations, units, and subunits likely started at the 103rd Airborne Brigade’s base.
Training classes lasted at least until Friday (05JAN) and involved service members of the 22nd Spetsnaz Company (SOF subunit operationally subordinated to the Western OC). According to unofficial data, the Wagner PMC representatives could also attend this event.
04-06JAN2024 – The training activity of the Western Operational Command
Analogically to the previous weeks, formations and units remaining in the subordination of the Western OC dominated the sphere of training activity.
On Thursday (04JAN), an unspecified duty subunit of the 6th Mechanised Brigade (possibly mechanised platoon/company) underwent an inspection, likely held in the home garrison.
At the same time, the T-72B and BMP-2 crews of the 11th Mechanised Brigade participated in live ammo control firing classes held at the 230th Combined Arms Training Ground.
What is more, also on Thursday (04JAN), soldiers of the 74th Communications Regiment underwent firing classes held directly under the Wagner PMC mercenaries.
A day later (05JAN), the Western Operational Command organised a training gathering for drivers-mechanics of the BTR-82A and Kayman vehicles, which engaged at least a dozen servicemen from the 6th and 11th Mechanised Brigades.
At the same time, soldiers of the unspecified subunit of the 6th Mechanised Brigade participated in firing classes. This likely refers to AGS-17 and RPG grenade launcher operators, as well as machine gunners of mechanised/reconnaissance battalion(s).
Another subunit of the 6th Mechanised Brigade (presumably an element of the 78th Mechanised Battalion) underwent a readiness review before departing to the training ground (likely Gozhsky Training Ground).
Presumably, at the Chepelevo Training Ground, the 11th Mechanised Brigade servicemen participated in firing classes using the infantry version of the DShKM heavy machine gun. Subsequently, their colleagues from the 557th Engineering Brigade took part in planned military speciality-related training classes. According to available data, they included the practical use of explosives and detonators.
Besides, on Saturday (06JAN), the Commander of the 11th Mechanised Brigade, Lt. Col. Sergey Shilin, likely with a representative of the Western OC, inspected the duty forces of the 11th Mechanised Brigade. Based on the published materials, at least a single 2S3 battery of the 841st Artillery Group underwent the inspection.
04JAN2024 – Noteworthy movements of Belarusian military equipment
Last week, only a single ground movement of Belarusian military equipment can be considered noteworthy.
This refers to a joint Belarusian-Russian convoy consisting of three MAZ fuel trucks, a single MAZ bus, and a light vehicle belonging to the Russian Military Police. Its movement was reported on Thursday (04JAN) between Baranovichi and Rusino.
Russian military activity in Belarus
Over the past seven days, Russian soldiers in Belarus presented almost no activity.
No air movements were reported. Aside from the abovementioned convoy, only one more Russian military equipment ground transfer was reported. It pertains to a single V-marked Ural trailer moving in Korenovka on Friday (05JAN).
That said, on Monday (01JAN), unofficial Belarusian sources informed about a recent visit of the Russian Rosgvardia delegation to Belarus. As noted, it was led by the Rosgvardia Deputy Director, Col. Gen. Vladislav Ershov, who visited the training centre of Belarusian Internal Troops and got acquainted with the structure, equipment and tasks of internal SOF subunit(s) and other law enforcement agencies.
A day later (02JAN), the Belarusian Hajun military monitoring team claimed that the visit occurred between 26DEC2023 and 27DEC2023 when the Russian delegation arrived in Belarus with a Tu-154 (RF-85135).
Wagner PMC activity in Belarus
Last week delivered some information about the presence of Wagner PMC in Belarus. In addition to the abovementioned training events of the Belarusian Armed Forces, representatives of the Internal Troops also participated in drills with “Wagnerites”.
On Tuesday (02JAN), presumably, an internal forces serviceman gave a short interview related to the recent training course led by the Wagner PMC. The man claimed that drills pertained to the aspects of trench fighting – proper movements, avoiding enemy fire and “dealing” with lack of ammo.
On Friday (05JAN), unofficial Belarusian sources informed about the continuation of joint training of the Belarusian Internal Troops service members and the Wagner PMC mercenaries.
Notably, a day later (06JAN), Wagner PMC operatives likely participated in firing classes for the chairmen of the Belarusian executive committees of the Mogilev Oblast. The event involved the Inspector of the Mogilev Oblast, Leonid Martynyuk, local Governor Anatoly Isachenko, and the Heads of the Regional Internal Affairs and KGB Departments. According to the Commander of the formation, Col. Vladimir Palvan, the region’s leadership “highly appreciated the readiness of the brigade to perform its intended tasks”.
Rochan’s assessment
- Personnel changes within the CSTO were routine and most likely resulted from Kazakhstan taking over the representation within the organisation. The new positions were assigned to experienced officers, who will directly supervise the issues related to military security and material-technical support within the organisation.
- Information provided by the Head of IMCD indicates that Belarus will intensify its international activities, which seems natural in the face of Western sanctions. It should be noted that the increase in the number of future activities does not necessarily correlate directly with their significance and impact, especially since most Western states have terminated their military cooperation with Belarus due to its involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian war.
- Considering last week’s training efforts of the Belarusian Armed Forces, inspections conducted in formations of the Western OC and joint exercises with “Wagnerites” were particularly interesting. Inspections most likely resulted from the upcoming holidays. They were meant to assess the readiness of duty subunits to respond when most soldiers would be celebrating with their families. However, it should not be ruled out that these drills precede the upcoming 6th and 11th Mechanised Brigades exercises. Regarding the training with Wagner PMC, it is noteworthy that it now involved not only servicemen of the Belarusian SOF or combined arms formations but even servicemen of the supporting unit, which typically should not be on the “first line”.
- In general, the activity of Russian Armed Forces’ soldiers remains consistently minimal.