Belarus Security Update – 11 – 17 December 2023
BLUF
No changes in the general posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces appeared last week.
Executive summary
Over the past seven days, the political-military situation in Belarus remained stable.
Politically, the Chairman of the Belarusian State Security Committee shared his views on the current situation around the state, but he failed to deliver any new point of view. The Belarusian assessment is that the West is to be blamed for the war in Ukraine, and it is continually working to destabilise Belarus.
The Belarusian Armed Forces leadership representatives continued their activity to summarise the previous military academic year (2022/2023). Military officials also actively participated in several international events. Belarus also hosted a working visit of the Kazakhstan Armed Forces delegation.
The training tempo of the Belarusian military formations again visibly increased. The military leadership initiated a complex combat readiness check of a single tank battalion (with induction of reserve personnel and removal of equipment from storage) and the sudden reediness inspection involving elements of the Air Force and Air Defence Forces (AFADF) remaining on the combat duty.
We also observed no changes in Russian Armed Forces activities in Belarus. Moscow may have rotated some of its forces two weeks ago (09DEC).
On the other hand, “Wagnerites” remaining in Belarus likely continued their training with the elements of the Belarusian Internal Troops. Some sources suggested that Wagner PMC members could be incorporated into Belarusian structures.
Political developments
12DEC2023 – The Russian President officially ratifies the joint Russo-Belarusian agreement
On Tuesday (12DEC), Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law ratifying the Russo-Belarusian agreement related to the creation and functioning of joint combat training centres.
This occurred a week after official ratification by the Russian State Duma (5DEC) and five days after its Federation Council (7DEC) ratification. Putin’s signature thus closes ratification procedures.
The previous Belarus Security Update (BSU, 4-10DEC) covered the topic in more detail. But to recap, two such centres currently operate in Belarus. The first is located in Baranovichi (61st Fighter Aviation Base) and is responsible for training Su-30SM crews. The second is deployed in Labno (1st Air Defence Regiment) and trains S-400 air defence system crews.
13DEC2023 – The security situation of Belarus from the KDB perspective
On Wednesday (13DEC), the Chairman of the Belarusian State Security Committee (KDB/KGB), Lt. Gen. Ivan Tertel, commented on the current situation around the state and shared some insights into the current thinking of the Belarusian political-military leadership.
The Head of the KDB pointed out that the West had reached an impasse in implementing previously set policies against Belarus. In this context, he stressed the West’s measures against Belarus were unsuccessful and transitioned into a “more hidden phase”. Nevertheless, Tertel assessed that the West would initiate a discrediting campaign against the upcoming (parliamentary) Belarusian elections (2024) simply because it lacks tools to influence internal decision-making.
According to Tertel, the West had prepared about 350 so-called “observers” (saboteurs), mainly in Georgia, Lithuania, and Poland, and had already laundered money for them. He stressed that they could be used to conduct a coup if necessary. He noted that there were seven groups (being trained?) in Poland which could organise terrorist attacks in Belarus, especially as some of them were led by former military personnel.
Referring to the participation of a Belarusian citizen in the preparation (and execution) of the recent attack on the Russian railway (Severomuysky Tunnel), Tertel noted that the perpetrator had received some money (from Ukraine) and was promised even more. According to the Head of the KDB, the Ukrainian special services likely recruited him remotely, which was possible due to his “inverted consciousness, as well as inverted ideas and values”.
Speaking about ongoing conflicts, Tertel emphasised that Western countries led by the United States and the United Kingdom were increasing their anti-Chinese rhetoric and activities.
Lastly, the Chairman of the State Security Committee highlighted that the joint activity of the special services was an important factor in the state’s integration in the post-Soviet area and noted that Belarus was actively preparing for the upcoming meeting of the heads of the foreign intelligence services of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS, 14DEC).
14DEC2023 – The meeting of the CIS special services representatives
On Thursday (14DEC), Belarus hosted the 19th meeting attended by the heads of security agencies and intelligence services of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The Belarusian President, Alexander Lukashenko, and the Head of the KDB, Lt. Gen. Ivan Tertel, participated in the event.
At the beginning, Lukashenko referred to the location of the meeting. He noted its symbolism, stressing that Belarus hosted it as a peaceful and stable state despite ongoing wars, political cataclysms, and Western sanctions.
The Belarusian leader stressed that the situation in the world was currently “not getting any safer”, especially since some conflicts were moving into their hot phases and some hybrid wars were being unleashed. In this regard, Lukashenko also mentioned the degradation of several international structures – from the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OCPW) and the International Organisation of the Red Cross. According to him, they became tools for fulfilling the interests of global world players, which was especially visible during the recent COP28 conference in Dubai.
The President of Belarus claimed that the delicate balance visible in the contemporary world was destroyed, which also pertained to nuclear deterrence. Lukashenko quoted his former Kazakhstan counterpart, Nursultan Nazarbayev, who claimed that “the world is closer to a nuclear war than earlier”. Besides, the Belarusian leader also pointed out threats in the information spectrum. He claimed that the informational war could even escalate into a hot conflict. He added that journalists and ideologues, who were “on the first lines”, should prevent it.
Lukashenko urged participants of the meeting not to allow internal “fights” among the alliance because CIS members were not as strong as they should be. He “strongly encouraged” them to help economies grow because it directly affected the internal situation in each state.
Later, the Belarusian President referred to the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict. He blamed Ukraine for starting the war by discriminating against Russian citizens and their language. Lukashenko rhetorically asked what the United States would do if Mexico behaved like this against American citizens. He also recalled his talks with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, during which he claimed the West would forget about Zelensky. Lukashenko stressed that mindless Ukrainian policy was mostly to blame for the current situation.
Nevertheless, the Belarusian leader also noticed “mean” actions of the Western states, which were not providing Ukraine with the support they had promised earlier and were trying to fight to “the last Ukrainian”. Lukashenko shortly referred to the conflict in the Ukrainian military-political leadership, claiming that the representatives of the Ukrainian Armed Forces have a different view on the war than Volodymyr Zelensky.
Lastly, Lukashenko spoke about the activities of foreign special services in Belarus. According to the Belarusian President, forms of the activity were becoming increasingly aggressive and even included terrorist attacks. Lukashenko brought examples of the UAV attack on Machulischy Air Base, Grodno, and the destruction of the railway infrastructure across Belarus as examples.
The Belarusian leader stressed that Belarus would continue to support Russia “in every possible way”. He also expressed his astonishment that the West couldn’t understand the strategic partnership between Belarus and Russia, especially since it was transparent and officially announced before the start of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict.
Military developments
11-16DEC2023 – The new data related to the Belarusian Armed Forces
Last week saw some data published on the structures, equipment, and development of the Belarusian Armed Forces.
On Monday (11DEC), published results of the table tennis competition held at the 120th Mechanised Brigade’s base confirmed that the unit had formed its own UAV Detachment.
Two days later (14DEC), the Belarusian MotolkoHelp team published an analysis linked to the recently introduced Belarusian-made mobile satellite communications system (MSCS), sometimes described as a “Belarusian Starlink”.
In the text, members of Hajun confirmed that the system operates analogously to the popular Starlink. However, it faces several limitations. Firstly, the 3G/LTE communications can operate only in the coverage area of Belarusian mobile operators. Secondly, satellite internet works based on a single geostationary satellite – Belarusian-Chinese Belintersat-1/ChinaSat-15 (MSCS can operate a two-way satellite connection, while civilians can operate only one-way channels allowing for reception of satellite-transmitted data).
Hajun informed that the internet access point was deployed in Stankovo – from there, all internet traffic is “spread” across the country. Notably, the Belarusian Armed Forces are forced to use the “satellite dishes” of the Russian satellite television operator (Tricolor) because the Belarusian Military-Industrial Complex likely can’t produce them independently.
Image 1. A photo of MSCS with a Tricolor company satellite dish (Source: Motolko)
Motolko also highlighted the potential drawbacks of the MSCS. They mostly pertain to the necessity to recalibrate the system after movement (to “find” a signal from a satellite), which makes it less portable than it seems. In addition, the fact that the system uses 3G/LTE networks makes them very dependent on mobile network signals (which can be problematic in case of the physical destruction of base station towers). Also, the fact that MSCS uses a single satellite, whose position is well-known, makes it vulnerable to jamming.
Members of Hajun also doubted Belarusian claims that the detection of such a system would be difficult, noticing that “BelGIE” (Belarusian Unitary Enterprise for Supervision on Telecommunications – state body responsible for the protection, monitoring, and distribution of radio frequencies) already proved that it can easily detect illegal users of two-way satellite Internet.
Also on Thursday (14DEC), the Belarusian Hajun military monitoring team provided more information about the military infrastructure built for the Southern Operational Command (OC). Specifically, a new military camp will be created based on five existing children’s camps near Novaya Buda.
On Saturday (16DEC), the Belarusian State Military-Industrial Complex announced the successful completion of “final acceptance tests” of the Belarusian-made 122-millimetre missiles used by the BM-21 MLR system. The mentioned sources provided a video presenting practical firing tests and noted that they were held in cooperation with the Belarusian MoD. However, no additional details were provided.
12-17DEC2023 – The domestic activities of the Belarusian military officials
Over the past seven days, the Belarusian military officials’ general “domestic” activity was standard.
On Tuesday (12DEC), the Chief of Belarusian General Staff, Maj. Gen. Viktor Gulevich participated in the expert council meeting to discuss the new Belarusian Military Doctrine draft. The Chairman of the Belarusian Council of the Republic, Natalya Kochanova, supervised the discussion. It engaged a representative of the State Security Council (its First Deputy, Maj. Gen. Pavel Muraveiko), as well as at least three more senior officers (including the Deputy Head of the General Staff Faculty of the Belarusian Military Academy, Col. Andrey Bogodel and the Head of the Informational-Analytical Directorate of the Belarusian General Staff, Col. Artem Butorin). Nevertheless, no exact details related to the course of the discussion appeared.
Two days later (14DEC), Gulevich led a summarising gathering for representatives of the Belarusian military commissariats. The event sought to provide results of their work in the 2022/2023 military academic year. Gulevich informed about the full fulfilment of military registration work and noted that after the start of the military academic year, the mentioned bodies should conduct a full-scale verification of military registration data of conscripts and reservists.
Refereeing to last year’s result of Belarusian military formations, the 61st Fighter Aviation Base (Baranovichi) support services achieved the best results (among all logistic bodies) of the Belarusian Air Force and Air Defence Forces. Secondly, the Grodno Oblast Executive Committee (EC) was announced as the best oblast-level EC in the Territorial Defence Forces organisation.
Speaking about the domestic actions of military officials, on Tuesday (12DEC), the Belarusian SB TV news outlet published an interview with the Head of the Electronic Warfare Directorate of the Belarusian General Staff, Col. Igor Danilchik.
After referencing the history of the electronic warfare (EW) subunits, Danilchik pointed out the differences between the work of the electronic warfare specialists of the Belarusian Ground Forces and those serving in the structure of the Belarusian Air Force and Air Defence Forces. Despite having different equipment, he informed that both types of EW subunits had similar tasks (electronic protection and electronic attack) and underwent training at the Military Reconnaissance Faculty of the Belarusian Military Academy. In this regard, Danilchik noted that, since 2023, the mentioned body had opened a third speciality dedicated to “complex technical control” specialists. He noted that it had already proven very popular, with up to eight candidates enrolling for one place.
Later, Danilchik acknowledged the Belarusian Military-Industrial Complex’s high competencies in electronic warfare asset production. He claimed that Belarusian-made systems received recognition in other states and had demonstrated their capabilities, surpassing some counterparts from France, Germany, or even the United States.
Regarding the combat use of EW subunits, Danilchik highlighted that electronic warfare specialists would be among the first targets during a fight. He noted that the Belarusian side initiated various measures to increase troop survivability, focusing on reducing equipment size and deployment time. The Head of the Electronic Warfare Directorate mentioned that Belarusian servicemen had developed standards for independent deployment and had managed to decrease the required time from 30-45 minutes (the Soviet standard) to five or seven minutes.
Regarding the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, Danilchik pointed out the increasing role of UAVs, especially when used “en masse”. He noted that electronic warfare subunits could neutralise “swarms of UAVs”, but they required precise frequencies used by the UAVs. According to him, this necessitates having various (radar and radiotechnical) data to create a full operational picture. Danilchik pointed out the use of various positioning systems (GPS, GLONASS, Beidou, Galileo) as a vulnerability that can be exploited against UAVs. However, he also stressed that larger unmanned aerial vehicles like GlobalHawk had redundant control, communication, and navigation systems, which can only be partially affected by EW.
Concerning the development of electronic warfare systems, Danilchik noted the constant “arms race” in both communications and electronic warfare. He said both development processes were strictly correlated because newer communication systems required new means to interfere with them. Danilchik also referred to the equipment fielded by the Belarusian Armed Forces. He praised the decisions made at the highest levels (President and MoD), demonstrating the detailed attention of military-political leadership to developing EW subunits. According to him, the Belarusian Armed Forces had practically no Soviet-made systems and would fully complete the reequipment of their electronic warfare by 2025. This would allow them to control the frequency ranges from 1 MHz to 6,000 MHz and even interrupt communications provided by Starlink.
12-17DEC2023 – The international activities of the Belarusian military officials
Last week, Belarusian military representatives participated in various international events.
Between Tuesday (12DEC) and Thursday (14DEC), Belarus hosted the visit of the Kazakhstan Armed Forces delegation, including likely two senior offices and the Kazakhstan Chief of the Rear, Col. Arman Mansurov.
On the first day of the visit (12DEC), foreign officials met with the Belarusian First Deputy Chief of the Rear (Chief of the Rear Staff), Maj. Gen. Alexander Molosov, and participated in official talks. On Wednesday (13DEC), they visited the 2336th Clothing Storage Base in Barysaw, where they got acquainted with the organisation and conditions of storage and maintenance of material assets and also inspected various types of clothing or clothing technical equipment used in the Belarusian Armed Forces.
No data on the third day of the Kazakhstan officials’ visit to Belarus appeared in open sources.
On Wednesday (13DEC), presumably, two officers of the International Military Cooperation Department (IMCD), jointly with the Head of the Legal Support Department, Col. Sergey Sauta, participated in an official meeting with the representatives of the regional delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross. The meeting sought to sum up the actions held in 2023 and agreed on an action plan for 2024.
A day later (14DEC), two other senior IMCD officers participated in the seminar on preparing informational materials about weapons and mine dangers. The event occurred in Moscow and was held under the International Red Cross Committee.
Subsequently (14DEC), the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) informed about the end of the joint consultations related to the organisation of training events in 2024 and 2025. Officially published materials confirmed that the meeting held in the video conference format engaged at least a single Belarusian colonel.
Military exercises
11-16DEC2023 – The training activity of the Belarusian Air Force and Air Defence Forces
Over the past seven days, the Belarusian Air Force and Air Defence Forces presented limited training activity. Nevertheless, this state of affairs changed shortly before the weekend.
Training actions held between Monday (11DEC) and Wednesday (13DEC) mostly referred to basic tactical training. They engaged all servicemen from the 377th Air Defence Regiment, some personnel from the 49th Radiotechnical Brigade (11DEC) and the 50th Mixed Aviation Base (12DEC).
On Wednesday (13DEC), firing classes occurred in the 61st Fighter Aviation Base.
Finally, on Friday (15DEC), the Belarusian Air Force and Air Defence Forces officially started a sudden combat readiness check. According to the official statement, the drill followed the Belarusian AFADF training plan and engaged selected elements of air defence formations and units. Officially, air defence and radiotechnical subunits (equipped in S-300PS, S-400 and Rosa-RB systems) moved to designed areas, where they most likely started their (training) combat duties.
The Belarusian Hajun team informed that the start of the drills was correlated with the intense training activity of Belarusian aircraft, which suggested that they were also involved in the readiness check – they likely simulated targets for air defence assets.
It seems likely that the check also continued on Saturday (17DEC).
11-16DEC2023 – The training activity of the Western Operational Command
Last week’s drills centered around the Western Operational Command (OC) activities.
On Monday (11DEC), elements of an unspecified tank battalion of the 6th Mechanised Brigade started a combat readiness check initiated by the Western OC Commander, Col. Vladimir Bely. On this day, at least a single tank company with supporting vehicles departed from the home garrison to the Gozhsky Training Ground in a combined way (tanks were transported on trailers while vehicles marched independently). Some of the tanks had “cage armours” attached to their tops.
Likely a day later (12DEC), tankers crossed the water obstacle using a pontoon bridge prepared by servicemen of the 557th Engineering Brigade (location) and started the actual part of the exercise at the abovementioned training ground. At the same time (12DEC), the Belarusian MoD officially informed about the ongoing drills, including removing military equipment from storage and the induction of tank subunit(s) reservists.
On Wednesday (13DEC), tank crews at the Gozhsky Training Ground prepared their field positions and camouflaged their tanks. Two days later (15DEC), they underwent combat coordination measures at the platoon level. According to available data, actions of the mentioned subunit likely continued on Saturday (16DEC).
On Tuesday (12DEC), the abovementioned Gozhsky Training Ground also hosted tactical-special training of an unspecified subunit, which conducted a march on skis and trained how to survive encounters with the enemy. According to the Belarusian Hajun team, drills engaged servicemen of the 22nd Separate Spetsnaz Company, who remain in the operational subordination of the Western Operational Command.
On Thursday (14DEC), tankers of both tank battalions of the 11th Mechanised Brigade participated in practical classes related to the T-72 tank driving, which most likely took place at the Chepelevo Training Ground.
12-14DEC2023 – The training activity of the centrally subordinated forces
Last week, soldiers of formations and units of central subordination presented minimal training activity.
From Tuesday (12DEC) to Wednesday (13DEC), the 51st Artillery Brigade soldiers underwent firing training using AK rifles and PM pistols held at the Osipovichi Training Ground.
A day later (14DEC), firing classes also occurred at the Uruchcha Training Ground. According to published materials, they engaged at least 20 Minsk Military Commandant’s Office soldiers.
Besides, on Tuesday (12DEC), the 227th Combined Arms Training Ground hosted BTR-80 driving classes dedicated to the fourth-year cadets of the Military Reconnaissance Faculty of the Belarusian Military Academy (BMA). According to the Belarusian Hajun team, drills engaged servicemen of the 22nd Separate Spetsnaz Company, who remain in the operational subordination of the Western Operational Command.
12-14DEC2023 – The training activity of the Belarusian Special Operation Forces
Last week, limited training efforts could also be observed among the Belarusian Special Operation Forces (SOF) elements.
A single noteworthy training action started on Tuesday (12DEC) at the Brestsky Training Ground, where soldiers of the unspecified air assault battalion of the 38th Air Assault Brigade initiated combat training classes. Published materials confirmed they also lasted on Wednesday (13DEC) and Thursday (14DEC). Officially, classes included drills related to fire, tactical, engineering and medical training, and the military topography.
13-14DEC2023 – The training activity of the North-Western Operational Command
Last week, training actions of the forces subordinated to the Noth-Western Operational Command most likely pertained to the 19th Mechanised Brigade.
On Wednesday (13DEC), tankers of the formation arrived at the Leplesky Training Ground, where they began their combat training classes. A day later (14DEC), the same training ground hosted combat training classes of the unspecified mechanised battalion personnel. However, it still needs to be clarified if they had a separate character or were conducted jointly.
13-15DEC2023 – Noteworthy movements of Belarusian military equipment
Last week, only a few movements of Belarusian military equipment can be considered noteworthy:
Tuesday (12DEC):
- A Ural truck and two MZKT-741501 vehicles were moving on the M1 highway near Kozeiki in an unknown direction;
Wednesday (13DEC):
- A single truck with three S-300/S-400 missile containers was moving in Machulischy;
- A single Kamaz truck with a ZU-23-2 gun was moving in Machulischy;
Friday (15DEC):
- At least two GAZ-66 and two MAZ trucks, as well as a single MAZ bus, were moving on the M5 highway near Vyeraytsy, also in an unknown direction;
Russian military activity in Belarus
Over the past seven days, Russian troops deployed in Belarus presented minimal activity.
Air movements were limited to the arrival of a single An-124 aircraft from Ulyanovsk to Gomel Airport, reported on Tuesday (12DEC), as well as the arrival of Tu-214 (RA-64521) belonging to the Head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, Sergey Naryshkin at Minsk Airport (13DEC) (meeting of CIS security officials – see above).
On Thursday (14DEC), unofficial sources also informed that V-marked Kamaz and covered Ural trucks were moving in Mazyr.
Interestingly, Hajun claimed that Russia conducted a rotation of its air defence troops deployed at Velyky Bokov Airfield on 09DEC (such information occurred on 11DEC and was confirmed on 14DEC). According to the provided data, the rotation involved up to 80-90 servicemen brought by An-12 (Gomel Airport) – the analogical number of troops stationing in Belarus likely returned back to Russia. As Hajun members noted, it can’t be ruled out that some of the newly arrived servicemen went to Zyabrovka Airfield. Both bases host Russian S-400 air defence systems.
Wagner PMC activity in Belarus
On Thursday (14DEC), unofficial reports claimed that the Belarusian Internal Troops and Wagner PMC mercenaries conducted joint training classes. Unofficially, it included various smaller drills, also related to trench fighting.
Subsequently (14DEC), several Belarusian sources quoting a Russian journalist, Konstantin Pridybaylo, informed that Wagner PMC representatives started their service in the 2nd Militsia Brigade of the Belarusian Internal Troops. This information resulted from the fact that during the official “performance” of the Tornado special subunit, several Wagner PMC insignias and flags appeared. This information, however, has not been confirmed independently.
Image 2. Wagner PMC insignias in the 2nd Militsia Brigade (Source: Reform.by)
Comment
- Last week’s political events did not substantially impact the security situation in Belarus. The exception is the agreement concerning establishing and functioning joint combat training centres. However, as already stated, the agreement was officially ratified several months ago. Russian ratification merely marked the formal conclusion of the legislative process.
- We also assess that the CIS security officials meeting will not impact the Belarusian political-military landscape. The gathering possibly served as another formal occasion during which Lukashenko could articulate his perspective on alliance cooperation and his stance on the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. In this domain, his narrative remains consistent as he continues to attribute blame to Ukraine and the West for the ongoing war. He endeavours to position himself as an advocate for peace and a mediator actively working to prevent further bloodshed, often resorting to classic threats of potential escalation or even nuclear warfare.
- The information about the new Belarusian-made Mobile Satellite Communication System (MSCS) confirms Belarus’ successful creation of a Starlink “equivalent”. However, the actual capabilities of MSCS are significantly inferior to its Western counterpart, a fact Belarusian propaganda downplayed. It is essential to note that while MSCS will enhance the capabilities of Belarusian signal troops, especially in facilitating long-distance communications, it falls short of being an invincible tool that NATO members cannot counter.
- Combat readiness inspection of the 6th Mechanised Brigade’s tank battalion and the sudden readiness check of the AFADF duty forces were undoubtedly the week’s most significant events. Regarding the first, it is noteworthy that the Belarusian military leadership opted to call up reservists and deploy equipment from storage, underscoring the comprehensive nature of the exercise and the military leadership’s emphasis on reserve training and mobilisation readiness checks following the onset of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict.
- Although many reports have suggested that Wagner PMC fighters have been incorporated into the structures of the Belarusian Internal Troops, this information has not been independently verified so far.