Belarus Security Update – 29 January – 04 February 2024

BLUF

Last week, the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces did not change.

Executive summary

Over the past seven days, there were no developments significantly affecting the military-political situation in Belarus.

The Belarusian military leadership representatives participated in the Union State Supreme State Council meeting, which ended with several bilateral agreements between Belarus and Russia, although neither pertained to military developments.

In the meantime, some high-rank Belarusian military officers travelled to Cuba for a working visit. Domestically, the actions of the Belarusian Armed Forces’ representatives focused on informing the public about the work on the new Belarusian Military Doctrine.

The general training activity of the military formations remained heightened. Most of the training events occurred within Western Operational Command’s formations. Some drills actively utilised UAVs, while others were held with the Wagner PMC mercenaries.

Elements of the Russian Armed Forces staying in Belarus were almost entirely inactive.

On the contrary, Wagner PMC personnel continued daily involvement in various training events with Belarusian Internal Troops and the Belarusian Armed Forces servicemen.

Political developments

29JAN2024 – The meeting of the Supreme State Council of the Union State

The only noteworthy political event of the last week occurred on Monday (29JAN) when Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko attended the Union State Supreme State Council meeting at the Konstantinovsky Palace.

At the beginning of the event, he briefly discussed his activities in Russia, acknowledging the tight schedule he shared with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin. Both officials had discussed various issues, ranging from problems in the multipolar world to those related to Antarctica or Africa. On the other hand, Lukashenko also highlighted that the meeting occurred at a challenging time, resulting from the upcoming elections in Belarus and Russia.

Referring to the results of bilateral cooperation between Belarus and Russia, Lukashenko observed the historically high turnover of both states, estimated at RUB54 billion last year. He emphasised the necessity of removing all obstacles related to mutual goods’ supply, business conditions for enterprises, and other barriers in public procurement and restrictions on the transit of goods. He cited the development of the Oktyabrskaya Railway (a railway connecting Western parts of Russia with Saint Petersburg) as an example of a relatively inexpensive investment that could significantly boost joint turnover.

Lukashenko claimed that the industrial sectors of Belarus and Russia could mobilise themselves and not be brought to their knees by Western sanctions through active cooperation in import substitution. However, he also underscored the importance of future actions in this area.

The Belarusian leader emphasised that both states have not yet fully decided on the most important issues concerning the creation of common markets for gas, oil, and other petroleum products. Nevertheless, he noted that these decisions would be made in the future for the benefit of both Belarus and Russia. Lukashenko also briefly mentioned the creation of a joint Russo-Belarusian media holding because the current state of affairs in the media sphere was unsatisfactory.

Finally, both states’ delegations participated in closed-door talks. During the discussions, the presidents approved the Main for Implementing the Provisions of the Treaty on the Establishment of the Union State for 2024-2026. Afterwards, Lukashenko and Putin engaged in a face-to-face meeting and joined the working dinner in the broader circle.

Military developments

29JAN-02FEB2024 – The visit of the Belarusian delegation to Cuba

Throughout the last week, several representatives of the Belarusian Armed Forces headed by the Minister of Defence, Lt. Gen. Viktor Khrenin, stayed in Cuba, where they participated in several bilateral events.

On Monday (29JAN), Khrenin, jointly with his local counterpart, General of the Army Corps Alvaro Lopez Miera, laid flowers on the Cacahual Mausoleum and spoke to Cuban journalists.

Delivering his statements, Khrenin emphasised that Cuba remained an important Belarusian partner and strategic ally in the Western Hemisphere. He observed that despite the geographical remoteness and cultural differences, both states were very similar and defended their freedom, independence, social justice and equal cooperation with other countries. According to him, Belarusian people, like Cuban citizens, appreciated the stability, tranquillity, and peace that allowed for constructive dialogue between states. Therefore, Khrenin added that both MoDs should also build such relations to ensure meeting the needs of both countries’ people citizens.

A day later (30JAN), members of the Belarusian delegation participated in official negotiations led by Miera and Khrenin. During their course, both officials spoke about the current international situation and directly discussed the prospects of bilateral military cooperation between their states. According to the official statement, the meeting allowed to find “strong historical ties” and common approaches related to the current and future situation. In the final part of the meeting, the Heads of both MoDs signed documents approving an unspecified bilateral agreement on military cooperation.

On Wednesday (31JAN), representatives of the Belarusian Armed Forces visited the Cuban Máximo Gómez Command Academy, where the Head of the Belarusian MoD delivered a lecture. There, Khrenin was awarded the Cuban Playa Giron medal, which is dedicated to people who have made outstanding achievements in the “fight against imperialism and reactionary forces” and also to those who have made valuable contributions to the Cuban Armed Forces.

The visit to Cuba ended two days later (02FEB). According to the Head of the International Military Cooperation Department (IMCD), Col. Valery Revenko, the visit resulted in several joint defence cooperation decisions. Revenko also stressed that Belarus and Cuba had reached an agreement related to their cooperation on countering external threats and exchanging experiences in preparation for the state and the development of the armed forces.

30JAN-03FEB2024 – The informational activity of Belarusian military representatives

Last week, the Belarusian officers continued their earlier announced “informational activity” to provide citizens and authorities additional data about the new Belarusian Military Doctrine.

On Tuesday (30JAN), the Deputy Head of the IMCD, Col. Dmitry Ryabikhin, shortly commented on the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons to Belarus. Firstly, he observed that deploying nuclear weapons was a strategic deterrence measure that Belarus was practically forced to undertake to guarantee its national and collective security (as a part of the Union State). Secondly, Ryabikhin pointed out that the arrival of warheads should be treated rather than their return, not deployment (as in they were deployed to Belarus during Soviet times, so their return to the country should not be seen as an extraordinary development).

A day later (31JAN), the Chief of Belarusian General Staff, Maj. Gen. Viktor Gulevich arrived at the House of Representatives to brief politicians about the new document. Gulevich emphasised that the document preserved the Belarusian “pro-peace” policy and did not treat any nations as enemies. That said, he noted that deploying Russian nuclear weapons was one of the main measures of the Belarusian strategic deterrence against the plans of certain world leaders. Gulevich also claimed that those who maintained hostile rhetoric towards Belarus should study new doctrine. On the other hand, the Chief of the Belarusian General Staff referred to the participants of the gathering, noting the necessity of providing Belarusian society with “truthful and objective” information about the work on the doctrine, its main provisions, as well as the Belarusian peaceful military policy in general.

Events to achieve this aim also occurred later in the week and engaged representatives of the Informational-Analytical Directorate of the Belarusian General Staff.

On Thursday (01FEB), the head of the directorate, Col. Artem Butorin, again commented on the new Belarusian Military Doctrine shortly before the informational meeting with representatives of the Grodno Oblast. He said the new document declared Belarusian readiness to defend its national interests. However, it also confirmed the state’s peaceful orientation, which did not consider any country as its enemy. The Belarusian General Staff representative assured that the document update did not result from a desire for conflict but aimed to align the doctrine with current challenges and threats. On the other hand, he noted that the new Belarusian Military Doctrine would not cover details related to the potential use of nuclear weapons in Belarus. He highlighted that their deployment was an example of a deterrent measure. Lastly, Butorin informed that representatives of the Belarusian military-political leadership would continue to actively provide information about the works on the document for the Belarusian people.

Two days later (03FEB), an officer of the same directorate, Col. Vladimir Apolonik, gave an interview for the Belarusian SB TV news outlet. During the interview, Apolonik spoke exclusively about the new Belarusian Military Doctrine. Initially, he referred to the earlier foreign and internal developments, which had determined the necessity of updating the document. He mentioned that the escalation of the military-political situation “between East and West” manifested in the militarisation of the Belarusian neighbourhood and increased military training activity therein. This will also result in changes to other Belarusian strategic documents – from the adoption of the new Belarusian Constitution to the upcoming update of the Belarusian National Security Concept.

Referring to the changes in the military doctrine, Apolonik pointed out that it would feature specific sources of military threats and military dangers of various levels. He explained that the new doctrine provided precise ways of countering various threats to military security, preventing outbreaks of military conflict.

He also recalled that the document’s purpose was to prevent potential conflicts. He mentioned a series of measures to halt conflicts before they reach the “point of no return”. Apolonik observed that the deployment of nuclear weapons was considered a necessary step, emphasising that Belarus did not seek war due to its past experiences with various conflicts.

Shifting to the economic aspect of Belarusian military security, Apolonik mentioned several further changes in the new doctrine. He noted the redefined aim of the document, emphasising a shift from preparing the state for conflict to focusing more on economically supporting measures to prevent war.

Finally, Apolonik emphasised that the military doctrine should be viewed as a system of perspectives rather than precise instructions, as other documents regulated these. He also highlighted the national character of the document and stressed the importance of informing society and the world about its provisions to showcase Belarusian commitment to peace.

30JAN-04FEB2024 – Belarusian Armed Forces’ procurement news

Over the past seven days, several independent sources provided new data on equipment procurement for the Belarusian Armed Forces.

On Tuesday (30JAN), the Belarusian Hajun reported four arrivals of Boeing 747-4FTF (B-2476) to the Minsk National Airport (from Ürümqi Diwopu International Airport) that occurred on 8JAN, 9JAN, 10JAN and 11JAN, which used closed part of the airport.

Given that the same aircraft transported Drakon (Dajiang) vehicles to Belarus in 2017, Hajun assessed that current arrivals also likely involved military equipment – either components of Polonez MLRS or simply new Drakons.

Also on Tuesday, the Western Operational Command (OC) Telegram channel informed about the upcoming deliveries of new rockets for BM-21 Grad MLR systems, allowing them to double their firing range (from 20 to 40 kilometres). Also, the 815^th Technical Support Center announced the end of the renovation of T-72 tanks operated by formations of the Western OC.

On Thursday (01FEB), the 6^th and 11^th Mechanised Brigades independently informed about the continuation of work on installing armour cages (with reactive Armor blocks) on their T-72 tanks.

A day later (02FEB), the Belarusian military television VoenTV announced that Крылья (wings) project (dedicated to citizens who would like to donate their UAVs for the needs of the Belarusian Armed Forces) project had already delivered more than 100 such drones.

Speaking about hardware procurement, the Belarusian Chief of Armaments, Maj. Gen. Andrey Fedin assured us that the military had been actively observing and analysing combat actions that were taking place in Ukraine. He stated that the Russo-Ukrainian conflict confirmed Minsk’s priorities regarding the development of weapon systems.

Fedin also stressed that the Belarusian Armed Forces’ armament strategy was based on two separate directions. The first assumed the proper maintenance of existing systems, while the second pertained to phased and planned re-equipment of Belarusian Armed Forces components with modern military equipment samples. In this context, Fedin mentioned missile forces, artillery, air defence, reconnaissance, electronic warfare assets and UAVs as priority areas.

On the other hand, he underscored that Belarus believed in “smart sufficiency”, and because of that, the leadership paid more attention to the “quality” of military equipment (its capabilities) to balance the quantitative advantage of unfriendly towards Belarus. That said, Fedin claimed that the Belarusian Armed Forces owned sufficient combat potential to inflict “unacceptable damage” to any aggressor. According to him, the deployment of nuclear weapons to the state, due to its significant deterrence effect, had allowed Belarusians to avoid the arms race and the necessity of investing substantial financial resources to purchase weapons.

Returning to the experiences of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, Fedin noted that the Belarusian Armed Forces had started work to improve the security of arsenals, bases, and warehouses. Moving to the deliveries of new military equipment, the Chief of Armaments informed that Belarusian Armed Forces had inducted more than 72 various types of weapons in 2023, including Mi-35M helicopters, B-300M MLRS, Iskander-M missile systems and Tor-M2 air defence systems. According to him, the “arsenal” of the Belarusian Armed Forces would be expanded by the adoption of additional Mi-35M helicopters and Tor-M2 air defence systems, as well as additional radiotechnical (Protivnik-GM, Vostok-3D, Rosa) and reconnaissance (Ragneda) assets. Besides, the Belarusian Army would receive modernised T-72BM2 tanks, BTR-70MB APCs, and BUK-MB2 air defence systems. It would also adopt Volat V2 APCs and Chekan kamikaze UAVs.

Speaking about the technical development of the Belarusian Armed Forces, it is worth noting that on Friday (02FEB), the Belarusian Polotsk State University opened a military department, which will prepare 100 reserve officers (2024) a year in four military specialities – artillery reconnaissance, ground electronic warfare, engineering-sapper and automobile (automotive).

Military exercises

29JAN-03FEB2024 – The training activity of the Western Operational Command

Over the past seven days, activities of the Western Operational Command’s elements continued to be the highest among all Belarusian Armed Forces functional components. Moreover, they participated in quite “non-standard” training events, also actively utilising UAVs.

Drills of the Western OC started on Monday (29JAN) when servicemen of the 111^th Artillery Brigade took part in the theoretical control classes related to combat training. At the same time, the personnel of an unspecified reconnaissance subunit (Volat-equipped) underwent practical training classes held in an unknown location.

On Tuesday (30JAN), UAV operators of the 6^th Mechanised Brigade started planned training classes using recently adopted UAV simulators. Personnel of presumably the 78^th Mechanised Battalion of the 6^th Mechanised Brigade undertook combat training classes with Wagner PMC personnel at the 230^th Combined Arms Training Ground. Moreover, an unspecified MLRS battalion of the Western OC left its home garrison before the upcoming special-tactical training classes. In contrast, servicemen of the engineering-sapper battalion of the 11^th Mechanised Brigade practised demining using UAVs.

A day later (31JAN), soldiers of the 6^th and 11^th Mechanised Brigades participated in comprehensive training classes related to the repelling attack on their garrisons. During the drills, they neutralised enemy UAVs and conducted search activities.

In the 11^th Mechanised Brigade, a UAV detachment conducted training on “UAV warfare” – its soldiers were trained to eliminate an enemy’s UAV with a special net dropped from their unmanned aerial vehicle. Besides, the same formation also organised firing classes at the Chepelevo Training Ground for personnel of an unspecified battalion.

At the same time (31JAN), personnel of the possibly 78^th Mechanised Battalion (6^th Mechanised Brigade) continued its drills at the 230^th Combined Arms Training Ground. Moreover, at least a single 2S5 Giatsint-S SPH crew of the 111^th Artillery Brigade (with cage armour) participated in tactical training classes on employing camouflage. Also, a single 2A65 Msta-B towed howitzer crew was trained in gun orienting and weapon protection.

On Thursday (01FEB), the exercise related to the garrison defence occurred in the 147^th Air Defence Regiment. Published data suggested that training engaged soldiers of daily and duty subunits. The presence of dedicated shotguns might indicate that the Belarusian Armed Forces have already created “anti-UAV” subunits in various military units.

Unspecified servicemen of the 11^th Mechanised Brigade underwent firing classes at the Chepelevo Training Ground. Personnel of likely mechanised battalion participated in firing classes combined with the joint use of skies and vehicles (shooters were towed). It is possible that servicemen of the 11^th Mechanised Brigade continued to participate in training gatherings for snipers at the 103^rd Airborne Brigade’s base. However, it can’t be ruled out that the 11^th Mechanised Brigade independently organised its drills dedicated to its snipers.

Besides, the 6th Mechanised Brigade and 48th Electronic Warfare Battalion drivers started their retraining driving classes, which were held based on local Volunteer Societies for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, and Navy (DTSAAFs).

On Friday (02FEB), soldiers of the 6^th Mechanised Brigade (presumably 78^th Mechanised Battalion) remained at the 230^th Combined Arms Training Ground, where they trained with the Wagner PMC personnel. Officers and ensigns of the 111^th Artillery Brigade took part in the control classes vehicle maintenance. The Telegram channel of the same formation also informed about the end of the training gathering dedicated to battery-level commanders. As noted, it mostly referred to the education and training of their subordinates.

Simultaneously, servicemen of the Engineering-Sapper Battalion of the 557^th Engineering Brigade took training classes on engineering reconnaissance at the squad level. Moreover, about 30 drivers of the 11^th Mechanised Brigade started their retraining drills, while service members of the 74^th Communications Regiment participated in special-tactical training classes.

A day later (03FEB), the 230^th Combined Arms Training Ground still hosted training classes of the 6^th Mechanised Brigade’s mechanised battalion. On this day, mortar batteries of the 11^th Mechanised Brigade participated in special training classes, firing from already prepared closed positions at the Chepelevo Training Ground. Besides, the Belarusian VoenTV informed about the end of a training gathering dedicated to personnel of demining subunits from the Western Operational Command formations and units. According to the material, the analogical gathering for Belarusian Special Operation Forces personnel will start soon.

29JAN-02FEB2024 – The training activity of the Special Operation Forces

Last week, the training tempo of the Belarusian Special Operation Forces increased and, more importantly, included battalion-level training.

It was held most likely between Monday (29JAN) and Friday (02FEB) at the Brestsky Training Ground. According to the available data, it likely engaged the 382^nd Air Assault Battalion, supported by subunits of the anti-air battery, who were responsible for searching, blocking and eliminating mock enemy forces in the battalion’s area of responsibility. The final phase of the exercise also included live ammo firing held during the day and at night. At least one Su-25 also participated in the drills.

Speaking about the activity of other Special Operation Forces formations, it is important to mention the drills of the 103^rd Airborne Brigade. On Tuesday (30JAN), the unit held combat training classes, which pertained to special, tactical and fire training at the home garrison.

On Friday (02FEB), at least one squad participated in such classes at the Losvido Training Ground.

30JAN-04FEB2024 – The training activity of Belarusian Air Force and Air Defence Forces

Last week, presumably no major training events with forces subordinated to the Air Force and Air Defence Forces Command were held.

Nevertheless, the Belarusian Hajun military monitoring team informed about training flights of Belarusian air assets. They occurred on the following days:

• Monday (29JAN, a fighter from the 61^st Fighter Aviation Bases and Tu-134 of the 50^th Mixed Aviation Base);
• Thursday (01FEB – aircraft and at least three helicopters of the 50^th Mixed Aviation Base);
• Friday (02FEB – at least two fighters from the 61^st Fighter Aviation Base and a single Mi-24 of the 50^th Mixed Aviation Base);
• Saturday (03FEB – a single fighter of the 61^st Fighter Aviation Base and Mi-24 helicopter of the 50^th Mixed Aviation Base); and
• Sunday (04FEB – fighters from the 61^st Fighter Aviation Base and helicopters of the 50^th Mixed Aviation Base).

31JAN2024 – The training activity of the centrally subordinated formations

Over the past seven days, the training effort presented by the centrally subordinated formations, units and bodies was relatively low. Only two events held on Wednesday (31JAN) were noteworthy.

It pertains to the training gatherings dedicated to the military psychologists, cadets and personnel of the Belarusian Military Academy. The first event had a methodological character based on the 72^nd Joint Training Center. Aside from about a dozen military representatives, it engaged a similar number of Belarusian Border Guards servicemen, who exchanged their practical experience related to the work with personnel and underwent the psychological obstacle course. The second event pertained to military service safety and was notably led by the Head of the Belarusian Military Inspection, Maj. Gen. Andrey Gorbatenko himself.

02FEB2024 – The training activity of the North-Western Operational Command  

Last week, only one noteworthy training activity involving forces subordinated to the North-Western Operational Command was reported.

It occurred likely on Friday (02FEB) when snipers, machine gunners, and grenade launcher operators of the 120^th Mechanised Brigade had combat training classes with live ammo firing. It is unclear where the event occurred.

29JAN-04FEB2024 – Noteworthy movements of Belarusian military equipment

No noteworthy movements of Belarusian military equipment last week were reported.

Russian military activity in Belarus

Over the past seven days, only two examples of Russian activity in Belarus can be highlighted.

On Tuesday (30JAN), an unspecified number of Russian fighter aircraft conducted training flights from Baranovichi Air Base.

Three days later (02FEB), a single Russian Ural-4320 truck was moving in Mazyr.

Wagner PMC activity in Belarus

Last week, both official and unofficial sources informed about Wagner’s activities in Belarus.

According to unofficial sources, the organisation’s troops likely started to lead another special-tactical training course for the servicemen of the Belarusian Internal Troops.

On Wednesday (31JAN), they participated in at least two training classes dedicated to snipers and servicemen of special Internal Troops subunits.

On Saturday (03FEB), they trained Belarusian servicemen how to storm buildings using small groups.

A day later (04FEB), the British Ministry of Defence said less than 1,000 “Wagnerites” likely remained in Belarus, where they were involved in  Belarusian Armed Forces and Internal Troops training activities. It remains unclear if Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko would use them “beyond their current remit”.

Comment  

• The decisions made at the Supreme State Council of the Union State Summit will undoubtedly deepen Belarus’ integration with the Russian Federation, leading to even greater dependence on Russia in the long run. No decisions impacting the military sphere were likely made during the summit.
• The Belarusian delegation’s visit to Cuba was courteous. Despite loud announcements about Belarus and Cuba’s military cooperation, it seems unlikely to provide tangible results for both states. Nevertheless, considering earlier unofficial information, one cannot exclude the possibility that Havana will purchase some military equipment from Belarus.
• The recent activity of the Belarusian Armed Forces representatives indicates that they have already begun implementing the task set by the Belarusian President to inform Belarusian society about the new military doctrine.
• Regarding training activities, particular attention should be paid to Belarusian efforts to counter enemy UAVs. It was especially visible during the exercises on the defence of military garrisons, but also presumably the first use of UAV to down another UAV conducted by servicemen of the mechanised brigade. Belarusians continue to equip tanks and artillery assets (especially in the Western OC units) with cage armour, which confirms the focus on drone warfare.
• The activity of the Russian Armed Forces and Wagner PMC elements remains unchanged.