Situational report from the war in Ukraine

Key takeaways from last week’s developments:

• Russian ground attacks continued across the entire front but delivered results near Bakhmut and Avdiivka; Avdivka was taken following Ukraine’s withdrawal after a four-month battle for the city;
• The overall operational situation remained largely unchanged; Strategically, Ukraine continues to be at a disadvantage, and the gap between Russian and Ukrainian warfighting capability will continue to grow; So far, Russian progress has been modest, but the likelihood of Russian breakthroughs will also increase;
• Russians sustained artillery attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and residential areas in the Kharkiv Oblast, although the intensity of these strikes decreased compared to two weeks ago;
• Russian attacks in the Luhansk Direction also continued; Russians remained focused on areas near Synkivka, Tabaivka, Bilohorivka, and Terny; They made minor gains near the latter.
• Russians made some gains northeast of Bakhmut, which was facilitated by the deployment of FPV drones; Avdiivka was on the verge of being taken as of Friday as Kyiv announced the withdrawal on the night of Friday to Saturday;
• Russians made minor gains near Robotyne in southern Ukraine; Although no other changes occurred, Ukrainians are increasingly concerned about Russian build-up that may herald preparations for Russian offensive action towards Orikhiv;
• Ukrainians maintained positions near Krynky on Dnipro’s left bank; Russian attacks were unsuccessful;
• Last week saw one Russian mass missile attack, while Shahed kamikaze drone attacks occurred almost daily;

Map 1. Frontline changes between 09FEB – 015FEB2024 (Percentage points show the part of an oblast under Russian control) (The loss of Avdiivka is not reflected on this map)

Executive summary

According to the Ukrainian General Staff (UGS), during the past seven days, in the Kupyansk axis, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) repelled 8 Russian attacks (16 two weeks ago) near Synkivka, east of Petropavlivka in the Kharkiv Oblast and Stel’makhivka in the Luhansk Oblast. In the Lyman axis, the UAF repelled 21 Russian attacks (61 two weeks ago) near Makiivka and Serebryansky forest in the Luhansk Oblast and east of Terny in the Donetsk Oblast. In the Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Mariinka and Shakhtarske axes, the Ukrainian soldiers repelled 424 Russian ground attacks (317 two weeks ago) near Bohdanivka, Klishchiivka, Andriivka, east of Novobakhmutivka, Stepove, Avdiivka, south of Tonen’ke, Nevel’s’ke, Pervomais’ke and Novomykhailivka in the Donetsk Oblast. In the Zaporizhzhia axis, the Ukrainian units repelled 7 Russian attacks (13 two weeks ago) near Verbove, Novopokrovka and Robotyne in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

According to the UGS, during the past seven days, the Ukrainian Air Force launched air strikes on 46 Russian concentration areas, one command post, and six air defence sites. Ukrainian missile troops hit 22 Russian concentration areas, five command posts, 14 artillery systems, one air defence system, four electronic warfare, two radar stations and seven ammunition and lubricant depots.

Over the past seven days, we assess that Ukrainians liberated approximately one square kilometre, while Russians captured around 14 square kilometres. The Ukrainian posture remained defensive despite some territorial gains. Russian attacks persisted across the entire front, focusing on the Bakhmut and Avdiivka axes. Russians are now approaching Chasiv Yar west of Bakhmut and are close to forcing the Ukrainian withdrawal from Avdiivka.

Both sides made marginal gains in the Southern Direction, but we still describe captured single positions or specific tree lines. No major developments are expected.

The overall strategic outlook for Ukraine continued to be critical, with few perspectives for improvement. Ukrainians can probably expect the pressure to ease slightly due to the deployment of FPV drones. However, the maximum this can achieve is for the frontline to freeze in certain areas, let alone create conditions allowing for a larger counteroffensive. As stated in the previous UCM issue, some Ukrainian problems with the conduct of the war are self-induced (a lack of mobilisation and infantry). Coupled with shortages in artillery ammunition and a lack of defences in depth, it will further exacerbate the Ukrainian position, potentially leading to larger Russian gains in the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.

Indeed, Avdiivka was the frontline in the Russia-Ukraine war since 2015. Russians found it difficult to capture because Kyiv established formidable defences in the area between 2015 and 2021. But once these were overwhelmed, Russians began to gain tempo. No comparable defences have been developed west of the city, which may accelerate Russian gains.

Map 2. Frontlines in the Donetsk Oblast Direction with 2015-2022 line of contact.

As the reader will see below, some Ukrainian sources expressed further concern about the Russian build-up of forces in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. If Russians attack north along the Orikhiv axis, Ukrainian hard-fought summer 2023 gains may be erased.

We also continue to see a significant Russian build-up potential. In this context, we must admit we were incorrect in our assessment that the Russian offensive potential in the Donetsk Axis was exhausted. Russians deployed new formations to the area and continued attacking despite heavy losses, especially within its armoured fleet.

Indeed, if we look at how the number of units deployed by both sides since early October, when the attack on Avdiivka commenced, we will see that Russia and Ukraine started with a similar number of combat units deployed to the Donetsk Oblast (43 vs 38), however, within a month, Russians increased this number to 65, while Ukrainians increased it to 44. Over the next two months, Russians continued to deploy forces to the region, reaching 79 units by mid-JAN24. Ukrainians sent in ten new formations. While Ukrainians peaked with 56 units as of last week, Russians hit 95 units. In other words, Russians increased their presence in the Donetsk Oblast by 120%, while Ukrainians increased their presence by 47%. This difference accurately portrays what access both sides’ have to manpower. Russians continue to mobilise and recruit. Ukraine’s voluntary recruitment is exhausted, and forced mobilisation does not generate numbers sufficient for addressing land forces’ needs to create new formations.

Chart  1. The number of Russian and Ukrainian units in the Donetsk Oblast since October 2023

There were some comments on the numbers above claiming that while Russian units are nominally under-strengthened (a brigade is, in reality, a battalion, while a battalion is actually a company), Ukrainian brigades have more battalions than Russian. However, this assessment does not take into consideration Ukrainian losses. As stated in the previous UCM issue, the Washington Post reported two weeks ago that some Ukrainian mechanised battalions were down to as few as 40 infantry troops, compared to 200 at full strength. To compare, in November, WSJ reported that a mechanised company from the 47^th Mechanised Brigade fighting near Avdiivka had 20 combat troops, down from 120 when the counteroffensive started. As such, both sides suffer attrition, but Russia’s potential to address losses is much greater compared to Ukraine’s.

A lack of fortification stood up in-depth, which also means that a lack of manpower and artillery could prevent Ukrainians from halting Russian advances, potentially leading to larger breakthroughs and faster gains.

Noteworthy events pertaining to the war

Saturday (10FEB)

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky spoke with his French counterpart Emmanuel Macron about Ukraine’s defence needs.

Sunday (11FEB)

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed new commanders of the Ukrainian Ground Forces, Territorial Defence Forces, Joint Forces Command and Air Assault Forces. This refers to Lt. Gen. Oleksandr Pavliuk, Maj. Gen. Ihor Plahuta, as well as Lt. Gen. Yurii Sodol and Brig. Gen. Ihor Skibiuk, respectively.
• Moldovan law enforcement agencies found a Russian Shahed UAV containing a 50-kilogram warhead near the Ukrainian border. As noted, the drone was likely downed by Ukrainian air defence.
• Head of SpaceX, Elon Musk, denied that his company sold Starlink terminals to Russia.
• Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said Armenia was not a Russian ally in the war against Ukraine.
• CNN informed that the Russian Armed Forces recruited about 15,000 Nepal citizens to fight in Ukraine. As noted, they were persuaded with a USD 2,000 monthly salary and the possibility of obtaining a Russian passport.

Monday (12FEB)

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a bill and officially extended martial law and mobilisation for 90 days starting from 14FEB.
• The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR) reported that operatives of Lebanese Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard were involved in the training of Russian UAV operators in Syria.

Tuesday (13FEB)

• The United States Senate passed the bill providing Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan with an aid package worth USD95.3 billion.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed former Deputy Commander-in-Chief Lt. Gen. Yevhen Moysiuk as Special Commissioner for the Implementation of International Security Guarantees and the Development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Wednesday (14FEB)

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky ordered the creation of a system linking the Ukrainian industry and the Ukrainian Armed Forces. As noted, it seeks to make the industry more aware of the army’s needs and inform the armed forces about the production capabilities of the state industry.
• German Minister of Defence Boris Pistorius claimed that his state planned to provide Ukraine with “around three to four times” as many artillery munitions in 2024 compared to 2023.
• Canadian Minister of Defence Bill Blair informed about the allocation of USD44 million to support Ukraine in setting up its fleet of F-16 multirole aircraft. He said the funds would cover spare procurement of parts, weapon stations and munitions.
• NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stressed that there was no direct threat of Russian attack against NATO members. However, he suggested that the alliance was aware of potential “hybrid threats”.
• Ukrainian Minister of Justice Denys Malyuska suggested that his ministry would propose “more radical” steps regarding the mobilisation of convicts in Ukraine.
• S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stressed that Ukraine was ‘running out of ammunition’ without the United States aid.
• Ukrainian Prosecutor General Andrii Kostin claimed that Russia used at least 24 North Korean-made ballistic missiles to attack targets in Ukraine between 30DEC2023 and 7FEB2024.

Thursday (15FEB)

• The British MoD announced that Great Britain, jointly with Latvia, would supply thousands of UAVs to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
• NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announced the creation of a joint NATO-Ukraine analysis, training and education centre, which would be located in Bydgoszcz (Poland).
• The mayor of the Russian city of Biysk informed about the explosion in the area of the local defence facility responsible for the production of ammunition, solid fuel charges for rocket engines, and explosives for industrial purposes.
• The Financial Times said Hungary blocked the approval of the new European Union’s sanctions against Russia.
• Hungarian Defence Minister Kristóf Szalay-Bobrovniczky announced that his state joined the NATO coalition for mine clearance in Ukraine. Hungary will be responsible for organising mine clearance training.
• The Third Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment of the World Bank informed that the estimated cost of Ukraine’s recovery and rebuilding would be USD486 billion.

Friday (16FEB)

• German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a new USD1.2 billion military aid package for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It will include 18 PzH 2000 and RCH 155 SPHs, two Skynex air defence systems, 120,000 artillery shells and 100 missiles for the IRIS-T air defence system, which will be fully delivered by 2027.
• Swedish Defence Minister Pal Jonson stressed that Sweden was open to providing the Ukrainian Air Force with modern fighters if it becomes a full-fledged NATO member protected by Article No. 5 of the alliance.
• The House of Representatives of the US Congress started its two-week recess without voting on supplemental aid to Ukraine.

Ukraine battle map

Please click here to access our interactive map and click here to access the archive.

The situation at selected axes and directions

Below, the reader will find information about Russian and Ukrainian units deployed in respective directions. We attach medium confidence to this data. The list is not exhaustive, either. However, the reader should know that we change/update Russian and Ukrainian ORBATs daily. Secondly, the unknown column shows the number of units whose current whereabouts are unclear. There are a lot of units uncommitted on both sides.

Chart 2. Timeline of changes in the number of Russian units deployed in respective directions (numbers in parentheses show a weekly change)

Chart 3. The number of Russian units divided by types in respective directions as of 16FEB2024

Chart 4. Timeline of changes in the number of Ukrainian units deployed in respective directions (numbers in parentheses show a weekly change)

Chart 5. The number of Ukrainian units divided by types in respective directions as of 16FEB2024

In the previous week, only one noteworthy redeployment occurred on the Ukrainian side.

Elements of the 3rd Assault Brigade (at least a single mechanised battalion) were redeployed from Bakhmut to Avdiivka. Because of that, the brigade’s position on our map within the Donetsk direction was adjusted – it was moved from Horlivka to the Donetsk axis.

We also updated the ORBAT of the Ukrainian National Guard, which is included in the UCM database and Scribble Maps. The new dataset includes four new brigades, eight regiments, and other structural changes. For instance, the DNIPRO-1 Battalion and the LYUBART subunits were removed as they became parts of the AZOV and the LYUT Brigades, respectively.

Last week, although the number of Russian redeployments remained limited, they still showed a continued focus on offensive actions in the Donetsk direction.

Firstly, we confirmed the arrival of the 10^th Tank Regiment (6^th Motor Rifle Division, 3^rd Army Corps) and the 381^st Artillery Regiment (150^th Motor Rifle Division, 8^th CAA) to the Donetsk axis. These units were likely withdrawn from the Kreminna and Bakhmut axes, respectively.

Secondly, available information allowed us to reposition the 1436th Motor Rifle Regiment (MOB), whose earlier whereabouts were unclear. The unit appeared in the Horlivka axis of the Donetsk direction.

Besides, we incorporated five new military units, which were created after the start of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. It pertains to three artillery brigades, a single motor rifle brigade and a single naval infantry regiment, which was probably stood up as a part of the new 55^th Naval Infantry Division.

Kharkiv Oblast Direction

No changes occurred in the Kharkiv Oblast.

According to Oleh Synehubov, the head of the Kharkiv Oblast administration, Russians continued to shell civilian infrastructure in the Kharkivsky, Bohodukhivsky, Kupyansky, Izuimsky and Chuhuivsky districts. In particular, Russians shelled Kozacha Lopan, Okhrimivka, Mykolaivka, Zemlianky, Vilkhuvatka, Dvorichanske, Dvorichna, Synkivka, Petropavlivka, Berestove and Buhaivka, Malynivka, Hatyshche, Lyptsi and Vovchansk.

Luhansk Oblast Direction

The situation in the Luhansk Direction remained largely unchanged. Russians continued to attack in the Kypuansk and Lyman axes, making some marginal gains.

On Tuesday (13FEB), Oleksandr Syrskyi, Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed, claimed that Ukraine switched to defensive operations, which seek to exhaust Russians and inflict maximum losses, using Ukrainian fortifications, superior technologies, such as UAVs and EW, and holding prepared defensive lines. Despite this, he added, that the ultimate goal of reaching the state borders had not been abandoned. Syrskyi assessed the situation on the front line as difficult. He also said that especially tense battles were occurring in the Kupyansk direction, where the Russian objective was to capture Kupyansk. To this end, they launched daily attacks on Ukrainian positions.

Syrskyi also said that Russian losses are 7-8 times higher than Ukrainian, but he did not specify where exactly.

On Wednesday (15FEB), Syrskyi further stated that the operational situation was highly complex and tense in the Kupyansk and Adviivka axes. The Russians continued to increase their efforts and have a numerical advantage in personnel, and they continued to use the “meat assaults” tactics. These assaults were constantly supported by aviation (glide bombs) and artillery.

A Ukrainian soldier claimed on Saturday (10FEB) that the Russians had brought fresh artillery pieces and tanks to Tabaivka. He added that gaining a foothold in the village was impossible, so both troops occupied the opposite outskirts of the settlement. Occasionally, small Russian groups tried to enter Tabaivka to reconnoitre the situation, but they later pulled back. The intensity of the fire was also high on both sides. On Sunday (11FEB), the Russian source asserted that the Russians were conducting flanking attacks near Synkivka after previous head-on attacks proved unsuccessful. The source said that Russians had achieved some tactical success, but he did not specify what these involved. The Ukrainian sources did not report changes.

On Monday (12FEB), positional battles continued near Synkivka, Ivanivka and Lyman Lake. Geolocated footage posted on Monday (12FEB) showed that Russian forces achieved partial success northwest of the Synkivka. On the other hand, the Ukrainian soldier said that on Monday, the UAF repelled Russian attacks near Ivanivka. Russians also tried to attack with the support of three tanks, but the UAF destroyed the first and damaged the second tank. The third withdrew. He added that the attackers were storming Ukrainian positions in some places, but the situation was generally quiet on Monday. However, the following day (13FEB), Ukrainian bloggers acknowledged that the Russians achieved partial success near Ivanivka, but they failed to progress near Synkivka, where two attacks were repelled. On Wednesday (14FEB), the Russian journals asserted that the Russian forces continued to pressure Ukrainian positions northwest of Synkivka but made no progress. The source also said that the Ukrainian units tried to counterattack near Tabaivka, but no information surfaced confirming whether they were successful.

On Wednesday (14FEB), Ilya Yevlash, head of press service for the Ukrainian army’s “Khortytsia” troops, stated that Russian units had intensified assaults with heavy equipment along the frontline in the Kupyansk and Lyman axes. Although the attackers had enough equipment and weapons, they faced certain limitations, according to Yevlash. For instance, barrels wore out quickly due to the high intensity of artillery fire. He added that Russians were trying to compensate for the lack of artillery with different types of mortars.

No changes occurred near Dvorichna. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks.

No changes occurred near Petropavlivka, Krohmalne and Ivanivka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.

No changes occurred near Svatove. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes during the week.

No changes occurred near Novoselivske. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.

No changes occurred near Stelmakhivka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.

On Sunday (11FEB), the Ukrainian blogger claimed that Ukrainian troops managed to push Russians back near Novovodyane. However, no detailed information was provided. The Russian sources did not report changes.

No changes occurred near Raihorodka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks.

Over the weekend of 10-11FEB, there were ongoing positional battles near Terny and Yampolivka, but no changes were reported. On Monday (12FEB), the Russian source posted geolocated footage showing that Russian troops advanced towards Terny. The same source also stated that Ukrainian forces attempted to attack Russian lines with an armoured vehicle east of Yampolivka but were unsuccessful. Additionally, the Ukrainian soldier mentioned that a new Russian FPV (presumably surveillance, EW?) unit had arrived near Zarichne on Monday. The soldier noted difficulties in movement along the Zarichne-Lyman road due to the unit’s use of new frequencies and increased range.

No changes occurred near Makiivka, Ploshchanka and Chervonopopivka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes/attacks. Also, no changes occurred near Torske and Nevske.

In the Kreminna area, no significant changes occurred. Positional battles continued in the Serebryasnky foresty and near Dibrova. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.

Battles occurred near Bilohorivka on Saturday and Sunday (10-11FEB), as Russians continued to try to cut off the industrial zone near Bilohorivka, but without success. Nevertheless, high-intensity Russian attacks were ongoing, featuring convoys with equipment and many mounted infantry. The soldier shared statistics from the last two days of fighting (8-9FEB), indicating Ukrainian casualties of two fighters dead and 20 wounded. Russian casualties were reported as around 40 dead and approximately 70 wounded, with 20 confirmed destroyed armoured vehicles. The soldier suggested that as of Saturday, the Russians were attacking in small groups, possibly accumulating equipment and personnel for future attacks.

On Monday (12FEB), the Russian source claimed that Russian units advanced 300 meters further into the eastern part of Bilohorivka and captured a part of the Shypylivka-Bilohorivka road. The source also added that due to the shortage of artillery rounds and the lack of quality logistics, Ukrainians mostly rely on FPV drones.

According to Sergey Zybinskyi, a Russian Western Group of Forces Spokesperson, during combat actions in the Kupyansk axis, Russian units repelled 15 Ukrainian attacks near Synkivka, Lyman Lake and Tabaivka.

According to Leonid Sharov, a Russian Centre Group of Forces Spokesperson, in Lyman’s direction, Russian units of the Centre Group of Forces, supported by air and artillery fire, repelled ten Ukrainian attacks near Torske, Yampolivka and Serebryansky forest.

Map 2. Frontlines in the Kharkiv and Luhansk Oblasts with Russian fortifications, 16FEB2024

(The data on Russian fortifications comes from Black Bird Group/DefMon3)

Donetsk Oblast Direction

Over the past week, Russian forces persistently shelled Ukrainian positions on the Bakhmut and Avdiivka axes. In the Avdiivka sector, they focused on pushing Ukrainians out of the city, targetting ground lines of communications, and consolidating control over already captured areas. Despite Ukrainian resistance and the deployment of some reserves, the Russians achieved notable advancements, exacerbating the already critical situation for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

On Sunday (11FEB), Russian sources claimed attempted attacks near Rozdolivka. Spirne, Verkhnokamyanske, Vyimka, and Ivano-Darivka remained unchanged. The same goes for Vasiukivka.

On Saturday (10FEB), the Russian source claimed that Russian paratroopers captured height 187, south of Bohdanivka. The Russian source said on Sunday (11FEB) that Russian troops continued to attack near Bohdanivka and towards Ivanivske but were unsuccessful. However, heavy battles for Bohdanivka had already been ongoing for several days.

On Monday (12FEB), the Russian source assessed that Russian attacks near Chasiv Yar led to pushing Ukrainians one kilometre back on the O0506 road leading to Khromove. UAF positions to the north also came under Russian control, allowing for increased pressure on Ukrainians still fighting in Bohdanivka. In addition, Russian forces managed to capture the Popovsky Forest as Ukrainians withdrew from the area after losing the height 187. In Bohdanivka itself, Russians also restored the previously lost positions on the eastern outskirts of the village. The Ukrainians were pushed back to the centre of the settlement, too. Another Russian source said on Monday (12FEB) that Russian troops had less than two kilometres to reach Chasiv Yar as Ukrainians were preparing to defend the settlement.

On Tuesday (13FEB), Khrystyna Voyak, spokesperson for a Ukrainian 4th Brigade of the Operational Assignment operating in the Bakhmut direction, claimed that Russian troops had indeed advanced near Bohdanivka. However, she denied the information from Russian sources that they were already two kilometres from the Chasiv Yar. But she said the situation near Ivanivske and Khromove had become more complicated. According to her, the number of Russian assaults and artillery attacks in the Bakhmut sector had increased.

The Russian source asserted on Tuesday (13FEB) that after the Russian troops captured the Popovsky Forest, the Russian paratroopers continued their advance towards Chasiv Yar. Also, near Bohdanivka, Russian paratroopers from the 98^th Airborne Division advanced as far as the intersection with the railway, where the Ukrainians established some fortifications.

On Tuesday (13FEB), the Ukrainian blogger explained why the Russians were successful in this area, mostly based on the massive use of FPV drones. Once Ukrainian defensive potential is degraded, Russian forces assault Ukrainian positions. The second reason was the low quality and a lack of engineering fortifications. Ukrainians only had trenches perpendicular to the front that could not provide adequate protection. The same problem with the fortifications was also observed in the approaches to Chasiv Yar.

On Wednesday (14FEB), the Russian source claimed that the Russian forces continued to conduct offensive operations near Ivanivske and Bohdanivka. The source said that Ukrainian forces held their positions. But the Ukrainian soldier acknowledged that Russian troops were some 100-200 metres from Ivanivske, trying to capture the first houses in the village. The UAF reportedly repelled these attacks.

On Sunday  (11FEB), the Russian source stated that Russian troops, supported by long-range weapons, attacked Ukrainian positions near Klishchiivka and progressed near the former. It is unclear what this involved. The Ukrainian sources did not report changes. On Monday (12FEB), the positional battles continued near Klishchiivka, but no changes were reported. On Tuesday (13FEB), the Russian journalist claimed that the heavy battles continued near Klishchiivka and Andriivka. The source, however, failed to provide detailed information. The Ukrainian sources did not report changes.

No changes occurred near Kurdyumivka. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes.

In the southern flank of the Avdiivka axis, on Saturday and Sunday (10-11FEB), positional battles continued near Novobakhmutivka and Stepove, but no changes were recorded. On Wednesday (14FEB), the Russian source claimed no changes occurred near Stepove and Ocheretyno. Positional battles occurred near these settlements, but no changes were recorded.

A lot happned near Avdiivka over the past seven days. Ultimately, on Saturday night, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces wrote on this Facebook page that “Given the operational situation around Avdiivka, with the aim of avoiding encirclement and preserving the life and health of the military, I decided to withdraw our units from the city and move to defense on more favorable lines.” He further claimed that measures were being taken to stabilise the situation and maintain existing positions. Avdiivka would be retaken, he added.

The withdrawal marks the end of Ukrainian presence in the city, which was on the frontline between 2015 and 2024. With capturing Avdiivka, Russians are slowly leaving behind fortifications Ukrainians established within nine years.

Elements of the 3rd Assault Brigade were deployed to the Avdiivka area to cover the retreat. There, they conducted several counterattacks on the Russian vanguard, giving withdrawing Ukrainian units some time and space to pull back. Despite this, some Ukrainian troops were captured. A Ukrainian soldier from the 110^th Mechanised Brigade who managed to withdraw described his experiences. Firstly, he stated his unit had been on the front line for 22 months (no rotations). Russians were attacking from all sides, while Ukrainian logistics were not functioning. He also highlighted the shortage of personnel on his side, while Ukrainian fortifications (west of Avdiivka) were not prepared. Personnel from his unit could only move at night, but Russian drones with night vision capability proved very problematic.

Altogether, since the battle for Avdiivka started in early October, according to Twitter user Naalsio, Russians lost at least 666 pieces of equipment, while Ukrainians lost 57.

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Opytne and Vodyane.

On Sunday (11JAN), the Russian source claimed that, supported by artillery, the Russian troops continued to attack near Novomykhailivka from the east, but no changes were recorded. Russians also tried to attack near Heorhiivka and made some progress. The Ukrainian sources did not report changes. On Monday (12FEB), the Russian source said that Russian troops managed to capture new positions near Pobjeda. Another Russian source claimed that Russian troops managed to advance towards Pobjeda, taking control of the triangle on the road and occupying landings south to the outskirts of the settlement. The source added that, as a result, Russian units could try to gain a foothold on the outskirts of the village and subsequently dislodge the Ukrainians from the settlement. Further progress in this direction will allow pressure to be put on Heorhiivka – Maksymil’yanivka from the south and Kostyantynivka – Paraskoviivka from the north. However, the source added that the Ukrainians had already moved reinforcements from the 95^th Air Assault Brigade to Pobjeda and nearby positions to saturate defensive lines along the road.

On Tuesday (13FEB), the Ukrainian blogger assessed that Russian pressure intensified in the southeastern part of Heorhiivka. The battles also continued in Novomykhailivka, and the Russians continued progressing in the village’s eastern part. At the same time, the UAF managed to inflict significant damage on Russian assault units. The Russian journalist claimed that on Tuesday (13FEB), the Russian forces captured new positions near Heorhiivka. On Wednesday (14FEB), the Russian source stated that the Russian assault on Novomykhailivka from the southeast led to Russians taking up positions on the outskirts of the settlement.

According to Vadym Astafiev, a Russian South Group of Forces Spokesperson in the Donetsk Direction, Russian units successfully repelled 39 Ukrainian attacks near Bilohorivka, Bohdanivka, Klichshiivka, Andriivka, Mayorsk, Kurduymivka, Shumy, Niu-York and Novomykhailivka.

Map 3. Frontlines in the Donetsk Oblast with Russian fortifications, 16FEB2024

Southern Ukraine direction

The last week delivered no major changes in the region, although Russians remained offensively committed near Robotyne, where they made marginal gains.

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Zolota Nyva.

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Novodonetske and Novomaiorske.

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Urozhaine and Staromaiorske.

On Sunday (11FEB), the Russian journalist claimed that Russian forces had made significant progress near Pryyutne during the past week (5-11FEB), but he did not provide any evidence to support this claim. The Ukrainian sources did not report changes. On Monday (12FEB), the Russian source said that Russian troops tried to attack north of Pryyutne but were unsuccessful.

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Novodarivka.

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported change near Levadne.

In the Orikiv axis, on Saturday (10FEB), positional battles continued west of Robotyne and near Verbove. The Russian source claimed on Sunday (11FEB) that Russian troops advanced one-kilometre northwest of Verbove. The Ukrainian sources did not report any changes. On Sunday (11FEB), the Russian source said that Russian forces had regained their previously lost positions northeast of Novoprokopivka. As above, the source failed to provide any evidence. The Ukrainian sources did not report any changes. As per both sides’ reports, various skirmishes occurred near these villages between Monday and Tuesday. However, geolocated footage published Tuesday (FEB 12) showed Russian forces advancing west of Robotyne.

On Thursday (15FEB), the Spokesman for the Tavria (Zaporizhzhia and Kherson Oblasts) operational-strategic group of forces, Dmytro Lykhoviy, claimed that the Russian forces had concentrated more personnel in the Orikhiv axis. According to Lykhoviy, over the past weeks, they had more forces deployed in this axis than near Avdiivka, noting that their objective was to capture Robotyne.

This information, however, contrasts with what Ukrainian military analyst Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on 15FEB. He claimed that Russians reorganised their forces in southern Ukraine by dissolving the Zaporizhihia Grouping of Forces and transferring existing units mostly from the 58^th Combined Arms Army to the Dnepr Grouping of Forces. If confirmed, the Dnepr HQ will command Russian units from the Western Kherson Oblast to the Western Donetsk Oblast.

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported changes near Novofedorivka.

On Monday (12FEB), the Ukrainian source published footage showing marginal Ukrainia gains west of Pyatykhatky. The Russian sources did not report changes.

According to Oleg Chekhov, the Russian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson, Russian units disrupted two attempts by the Ukrainian forces to rotate units to forward positions near Staromaiotske, Rivnopil and Marfopil. Russian forces also repelled five Ukrainian attacks near Pryyutne and Vodiane.

Map 4. Frontlines in Southern Ukraine  with Russian fortifications, 16FEB2024

Kherson Direction and Crimea

No significant changes occurred in the Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian forces continued to hold a bridgehead on the left bank despite Russian attacks.

The Russian source claimed on Saturday (10FEB) that battles continued near Krynky, but no changes were recorded. The Ukrainian sources did not report any changes. On Sunday (11FEB), geolocated footage showed some Ukrainian gains in the settlement. Russian sources said on Monday (12FEB) that the Russian units continued to strike Ukrainian positions on the right bank of the Dnipro River, including the Beryslav area. The source said that there were no changes in the line of contact, and the Ukrainians continued to hold part of the Krynky settlement despite their difficulties in moving troops and equipment across the river due to Russian artillery and drone strikes.

On Sunday (11FEB), the Ukrainian soldier asserted that the Russian Armed Forces were testing their new drones that can avoid Ukrainian electronic warfare assets on the frontline. The Russians first tried to attack the UAF boat using drones, but “an electronic warfare dome” covered the vessel. It is unclear how “new” the system was. It was likely a portable jammer, which is increasingly common on the battlefield.

On Tuesday (13FEB), Natalia Humeniuk, the spokesperson for the Ukrainian Command South, claimed that Russian units had conducted two to three assaults on Ukrainian positions on the Dnipro’s left bank per day. She added that the Russians were actively using FPV drones, with up to 50 units per day. Humeniuk also assessed that Russian assault units lost up to 70 per cent of their personnel in ground assaults.

Black Sea

On Tuesday (14FEB), Ukrainian military intelligence (HUR) reported that its Group 13 launched a drone attack against the Russian large landing ship Ropucha-I-class Caesar Kunikov (Project 775). The attack was successful and resulted in the ship sinking. The vessel was attacked by Magura V5 attack drones off the coast of Crimea near the city of Alupka when it was reportedly en route transporting supplies between Novorossyisk and Sevastopol. HUR claimed the rescue operation was unsuccessful, but the number of casualties is unknown.

Coincidentally, the ship was named after Soviet Naval Infantry officer Tsezar Kunikov, who died on 14FEB1943, exactly 81 years before Caesar Kunikov was sunk.

Image 1. Magura V5 attack drone approaching already hit Tsezar Kunikov

Image 2. Damaged Tsezar Kunikov leaning to the port side

Since the start of the full-scale invasion, Russia has lost three Project 775 LLSs, with one more damaged. The loss of Saratov Aligator-class LLS (Project 1171) puts the total number of LLS lost to five. It significantly impacts Russian maritime logistics capability in the Black Sea. The Black Sea Fleet still fields nine LLS, but the number is insufficient to launch an amphibious operation, irrespective of whether it would now be feasible given Ukrainian maritime drone presence and anti-shipping capability in the theatre.

Ukrainian naval sources claimed that since FEB22, the BSF had lost 26 vessels, with 15 more seriously damaged. The BSF had 80 vessels under its command at the start of the full-scale invasion.

As a result of the successful strike on Tsezar Kunikov, the BSF commander, Admiral Viktor Sokolov, was reportedly dismissed from his post.

Map 5. Frontlines in the Kherson Oblast with Russian fortifications, 16FEB2024

Summary of losses

According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 571 aircraft (+1), 266 helicopters (+1), 12,571 UAVs (+434), 469 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(+5), 15,060 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+107), 1,221 MLRS launchers (+3), 8,067 field artillery guns and mortars (+67), as well as 18,747 units of special military vehicles (+343).

According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 400,300 personnel (+6,030), 6,465 tanks (+71), 12,129 armoured combat vehicles (+187), 9,641 artillery systems (+182) and 984 MLR systems (+3), 671 anti-aircraft systems (+4), 332 aircraft (0) and 325 helicopters (+1), and 7,408 UAVs (+173), 1,895 cruise missiles (+14), 25 warships and boats (+1), submarines 1 (0), 12,716 vehicles and fuel tanks (+137), and 1,528 special vehicles (+16).

(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change)

Russian strikes and attacks in Ukraine

Russians continued to conduct mass missile and Shahed 131/136 strikes, although their intensity continued to be limited.

On Wednesday/Thursday night (14/15FEB), Russians launched a mass missile strike. It included 12  Kh-101/Kh-555/Kh-55 cruise missiles fired from Tu-95MS strategic bomber aircraft, six 9M723 Iskander-M/North Korean KN-23 ballistic missiles, two Kalibr cruise missiles, four Kh-59 TV-guided cruise missiles and two missiles fired from S-300 air defence systems, for the total of 26 missiles Ukrainians claimed to have intercepted eight Kh-101s/Kh-555s/Kh-55s, one ballistic missile, two Kalibrs, and two Kh-59s, which gives an interception rate of 50%. Shooting down ballistic missiles continues to be an issue for Ukrainian air defences.

Over the past week, Russians launched Shaheds between Saturday and Tuesday (10-130EB). The Ukrainian Air Force Command claims that Russians altogether launched 116 vehicles, of which 103 were intercepted (89%). The largest attack occurred on Sunday (10FEB) when 45 UAVs were launched and 40 shot down.

Ground attacks decreased. Russians averaged 88 attacks per day, compared to 92 two weeks ago. Attacks peaked on Monday (11FEB) when they reached 100. They bottomed at 71 two days later (13FEB).

Battlefield missile attacks again decreased. Ukrainians reported 27 attacks over the past week, averaging four per day. Two weeks ago, this number stood at 5.3 (Ukrainians reported 34 attacks on 15FEB, but it included 26 missiles fired in a mass strike described above.

Air strikes saw a massive spike. Two weeks ago, Russians averaged 46 air strikes per day. Last week, this number stood at 106. On Wednesday (13FEB), Russians reportedly conducted 159 air strikes, the largest number since we started tracking this data in March 2023. The scope of these attacks was likely linked to the Battle for Avdiivka. Indeed, Ukrainian sources reported that up to 60 KAB bombs were dropped on Ukrainian positions daily. We assess that such a high tempo is not sustainable.

Indeed, increased air activity was linked to a rise in MLRS attacks. Two weeks ago, Russians averaged 75 strikes per day. Last week, this number stood at 115. Russians also peaked on Wednesday with 162 attacks, the second largest number since March 2023.

Chart  8. The number of reported Russian ground attacks since March 2023 (Source: Ukrainian General Staff)

Chart  9. The number of reported Russian air strikes since March 2023 (Source: Ukrainian General Staff)

Chart  10. The number of reported Russian MLRS attacks since March 2023 (Source: Ukrainian General Staff)

Chart  11. The number of reported Russian missile strikes since March 2023 (Source: Ukrainian General Staff)

Chart 11. Russian air and missile strikes on Ukraine (Shaheds excluded) (Source: Ukrainian Air Force Command/General Staff)

Chart  13. The number of Shehed 131/136 kamikaze drones fired and intercepted since SEP2023 (Source: Ukrainian Air Force Command)

The chart now features the number of fired Shaheds. This means we had to cut down the period shown on the chart. Otherwise, it is too cluttered. We still maintain the master dataset, which covers all strikes.

Outlook for the week of 17FEB2024 – 23FEB2024

In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we use a set of terms proposed by the US Intelligence Community.

To introduce more accountability to our forecasts, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.

Previous forecast

“Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we continue to expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue (no change) conducting artillery attacks on civilian areas across the region. Russian cross-border infiltration operations are also certain to continue (no change).” This assessment was correct.

Score: 1/1

“When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, we maintain that Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk and Lyman axes are highly likely (no change) to continue. There is a roughly even chance (no change) that they will capture one village or more. We continue to expect no Ukrainian gains in the region.” Russians made no confirmed gains in the region over the past week.

Score: 0.5/1

“When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, we are still assessing that the probability of Ukrainian gains is remote (no change). We maintain that Russians are highly likely to capture some terrain (no change) in the Mariinka, Avdiivka and Bakhmut axes. There is a roughly even chance (no change) that they will capture one village or more.” Although this assessment was largely correct, Avdiivka was on the verge of being taken as of Friday. On Saturday morning, Ukrainian units withdrew from most of the city.

Score: 0/1

“Moving onto the Southern Direction, we currently assess that chances are remote (no change) that Ukrainians will make any gains in the region. We assess that Russians are likely (no change) to progress in the region (capture some terrain). Still, we assess they are unlikely to capture a village or more (no change).” No major changes occurred in the region over the past week. Russians made marginal gains near Robotyne.

Score: 1/1

“In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians are highly likely (no change) to sustain ground presence on Dnipro’s left bank. It is highly unlikely (no change) that they will capture some land, and we assess that changes are remote (no change) they will capture one village or more. On the other hand, Russians are highly likely (no change) to sustain pressure on the Ukrainian bridgehead but are unlikely (no change) to eliminate it completely.” This assessment was correct.

Final Score: 3.5/5 (70%)

The forecast for the week of 17FEB2024 – 23FEB2024

In parenthesis, we indicate a probability change compared to the previous assessment.

Regarding the Kharkiv Oblast Direction, we continue to expect no frontline changes. There is a small possibility that Russians will conduct cross-border raids, but they will certainly continue (no change) conducting artillery attacks on civilian areas across the region. Russian cross-border infiltration operations are also certain to continue (no change).

When it comes to the Luhansk Oblast Direction, we maintain that Russian ground attacks in the Kupyansk and Lyman axes are highly likely (no change) to continue. There is a roughly even chance (no change) that they will capture one village or more. We continue to expect no Ukrainian gains in the region.

When it comes to the Donetsk Oblast, we are still assessing that the probability of Ukrainian gains is remote (no change). We maintain that Russians are highly likely to capture some terrain (no change) in the Mariinka and Bakhmut axes. There is roughly even chance that Russians will continue attacking west from the Avdiivka area (new item) to keep the momentum going;

Moving onto the Southern Direction, we currently assess that chances are remote (no change) that Ukrainians will make any gains in the region. We assess that Russians are likely (no change) to progress in the region (capture some terrain). Still, we assess they are unlikely to capture a village or more (no change).

In the Kherson Oblast, we assess that Ukrainians are highly likely (no change) to sustain ground presence on Dnipro’s left bank. It is highly unlikely (no change) that they will capture some land, and we assess that changes are remote (no change) they will capture one village or more. On the other hand, Russians are highly likely (no change) to sustain pressure on the Ukrainian bridgehead but are unlikely (no change) to eliminate it completely.