Issue No 11 (11) 2025 – 02JUL-20JUL2025

Executive Summary

The 01–20JUL2025 reporting period was characterised by intensifying attritional warfare in Ukraine, deepening strategic divergence between Kyiv and Moscow,
and elevated hybrid threat activity along NATO’s Eastern Flank. Both Ukraine and Russia escalated their long-range strike campaigns while pursuing parallel political
and industrial strategies aimed at ensuring strategic endurance. Belarus continued to align itself with Moscow, expanding its legal mobilisation framework and
conducting routine exercises in preparation for Zapad-2025. Meanwhile, NATO front-line states accelerated defence investments, infrastructure expansion, and
force modernisation.

Ukraine’s strategic position reflects a mix of defensive resilience and structural fragility. While defensive lines held in key areas such as Pokrovsk and Kharkiv,
Russian drone saturation and manpower asymmetry have pushed Ukrainian forces toward an increasingly static, attritional model. Casualty estimates exceed
769,000 dead and wounded since 2022, with desertions surpassing 230,000 cases. Despite these constraints, Ukraine’s military continues to adapt, exemplified by
corps-level reforms, drone innovation, and targeted deep strikes on Russian oil and industrial infrastructure.

Kyiv’s relationship with the European Union has strengthened, underpinned by EUR 2.3 billion in new support and proposals to double the Ukraine Facility to EUR
100 billion. However, US-Ukraine ties have weakened under the Trump administration, with pauses in aid—particularly in air defence—exacerbating Ukraine’s
vulnerability to Russian strikes. Kyiv’s defence-industrial base is expanding rapidly, with output expected to reach USD 15 billion in 2025 and drone production
exceeding 1 million units annually.

Moscow’s summer campaign has focused on cumulative territorial attrition, hybrid integration of occupied regions, and international outreach to non-Western
partners. Russian forces advanced ~665 km² in June and achieved local gains in July, particularly along the Pokrovsk and Kreminna axes. However, these advances
have come at the cost of nearly 1 million cumulative casualties. Russia’s use of swarm drone tactics (728 strikes on 09JUL) and massed artillery remains central to
its attritional strategy, supported by drone production hubs such as Alabuga. Russia’s global posture relies on alliances with China, Iran, North Korea, and India to evade sanctions and maintain supply chains. Strategic risks include overreliance on Chinese technology, a fragile domestic economy strained by >6% GDP defence spending, and the looming threat of US secondary sanctions on energy exports, which could reduce oil revenues by 30–50%. Moscow continues to pursue a “buffer zone” strategy in eastern Ukraine, but is unlikely to achieve full objectives in
Donetsk Oblast by year-end.

Belarus maintained a posture of strategic ambiguity, continuing military preparations while amplifying rhetoric against NATO. On 18JUL, President Lukashenko
signed a decree expanding the Belarusian Armed Forces’ legal authority to requisition civilian vehicles and drones during wartime. Belarus also conducted a high
volume of small-scale exercises across engineering, mechanised, and air defence units. The tempo aligns with preparations for Zapad-2025, which Belarusian
leadership claims will be scaled down to avoid escalation.

Russian UAV violations of Belarusian airspace reached record levels in early July, with multiple intrusions triggering Belarusian defensive responses and occasional
cross-border spillover into NATO airspace. Although no confirmed activity from Wagner PMC forces was reported, the militarisation of Belarusian civil structures
continues apace, reinforcing Minsk’s role as a staging area and hybrid actor within Russia’s regional campaign.

Estonia deepened integration with NATO and the EU, launching construction plans for a 1,000-troop base in Narva and inaugurating a Frontex command centre in
Narva-Jõesuu. The EDF conducted HIMARS live-fire drills and began CAESAR howitzer training, while also piloting conscription incentives and civil defence
innovations like 5G-based “pocket sirens.” Estonian intelligence confirmed increased Russian hybrid activity, including sabotage and cyber operations.
Latvia advanced border fortification under the Baltic Defence Line and launched its National Defence Service intake, with 75% of 757 new recruits volunteering.
The Defence Ministry signed a EUR 22 million deal for M3 amphibious bridge/ferry systems and initiated production of Patria 6×6 APCs for Ukraine. Latvia also
hosted allied divers for DIVEX25 and contributed 5,000 drones to Ukraine via the Drone Coalition.
Vilnius pushed forward a EUR 3.6 million infrastructure overhaul for its volunteer forces and reaffirmed plans for universal conscription by 2030. Frictions emerged
with Germany over command authority for the deployed Bundeswehr brigade, though NATO’s chain of command remains intact. Lithuania also responded to a
Belarusian drone incursion, calling for a multi-layered air defence upgrade. On the industrial front, Lithuania procured Polish GROM MANPADS and launched a new
cybersecurity regime.

Warsaw moved decisively to rearm, withdrawing from the Ottawa Convention to reintroduce anti-personnel mines, and planning its own large-scale exercise
(“Żelazny Obrońca”) to shadow Zapad-2025. Defence spending for 2026 was set at PLN 126.7 billion. Procurement efforts included French and Spanish submarine
offers, a major SAR satellite investment with ICEYE, and an ambitious artillery munitions programme aiming for 180,000 shells/year by 2028. Poland also began
realigning force structure ahead of a projected international crisis window in 2027.

Bucharest reaffirmed its professional, volunteer-only force model and expanded its Black Sea security role by assuming command of a NATO mine countermeasures
group. Defence Minister Moşteanu confirmed the acquisition of 18 SHORAD/VSHORAD air defence systems from Rafael, with further expansion planned.
Rheinmetall continued work on Skynex upgrades and Lynx IFV production, while Romania purchased a Turkish offshore patrol vessel and signed radar co-production
agreements with Northrop Grumman. A domestic powder factory remains delayed despite EUR 47 million in EU backing.

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