Issue No 16 (16) 2025 – 18 – 26AUG2025

Executive Summary

The 18–26 AUG reporting period was characterised by sustained high-intensity attrition, with Russian forces continuing to press along multiple Donbas axes while absorbing significant losses. Over 900 combat engagements were recorded, producing incremental Russian territorial gains. Yet Ukrainian counterattacks, including the liberation of Myrne and Tolstoi, reclaimed roughly 40 sq km, underscoring the porosity of the FLOT in undermanned sectors and the capacity of limited counteroffensives to reverse local Russian gains.

Ukraine’s asymmetric strike campaign expanded in depth and intensity, with over 1,000 drones and several missile salvos targeting Russian refineries, oil pumping stations, depots, and rail nodes in Tambov, Rostov, Bryansk, and Luhansk. These operations degraded Russian sustainment capacity by 10–20% and forced the redeployment of air defence assets. Strikes on the Unecha pumping station, Novoshakhtinsk refinery, and Ust-Luga terminal exemplified the cumulative disruption imposed on Russian logistics and energy infrastructure. However, Russia’s growing reliance on electronic warfare increases the risk of UAV misfires and spillover into neighbouring states, creating potential escalation triggers.

On the battlefield, Russia showcased continued adaptation through motorcycle-borne assault groups, UAV reconnaissance-strike complexes, and infiltration tactics, but structural fragility remains acute. Losses in airborne and naval infantry formations exceeded 70–80% in key sectors, while reliance on minimally trained “one-monthers” underlines the unsustainability of current offensive methods. Industrial bottlenecks persist despite sanctions circumvention and external support from North Korea and Iran. Domestically, coercive mobilisation and rising fuel shortages—exacerbated by Ukrainian strikes—are eroding economic resilience.

Politically, Ukraine reinforced its diplomatic positioning during Independence Day messaging and through security consultations with Western partners, securing additional financial support for drones, air defence, and industrial expansion. Nonetheless, mobilisation challenges, desertion scandals, and political infighting remain structural vulnerabilities that could constrain Ukraine’s ability to sustain operational tempo.

Looking ahead, Russian pressure will remain concentrated on Pokrovsk and Toretsk, with the intent of threatening Ukrainian logistics hubs at Kostiantynivka and Chasiv Yar before winter. Forecasting suggests continued Russian attritional gains but at disproportionate cost, while Ukraine’s ability to sustain deep strikes and industrial scaling will determine whether operational balance can be preserved.

In Belarus, President Lukashenka continued to cultivate his image as a potential mediator in the conflict, emphasising Belarus’s role as a peace-broker in international messaging. This narrative seeks to reduce Minsk’s exposure to sanctions pressure and to present Belarus as a stabilising actor distinct from Moscow. At the same time, the reality on the ground points in the opposite direction: the tempo of exercises has intensified significantly in the lead-up to Zapad-2025. Instructor-methodological sessions, communications-troops drills, and live-fire training by Polonez-equipped artillery and mechanised brigades all underline Belarus’s integration into the Russian military architecture. The juxtaposition between Lukashenka’s peace rhetoric and the high operational tempo highlights Belarus’s dual role: outwardly positioning itself as a neutral facilitator, while in practice functioning as a forward training and staging platform for Russian forces.

NATO Eastern Flank countries continued to reinforce their deterrence posture as hybrid pressure and spillover risks mounted. The Baltic states report persistent GPS jamming linked to Russian actors, while a growing concern is the risk of drone spillover from the Ukraine–Russia conflict. Ukraine’s expanded deep-strike campaign, combined with Russia’s heavy use of electronic warfare, has already caused UAVs to stray into border areas. Although most incidents have been contained, further crashes in the Baltic states or Poland—potentially resulting in material damage or civilian casualties—represent an emerging escalation trigger. These risks will drive investments in integrated air surveillance, forward-based air defences, and rapid attribution mechanisms to prevent accidents from spiralling into confrontation. Poland began its Iron Defender-2025 exercise, which is a response to the joint Russo-Belarian Zapad-2025. Collectively, these developments highlight an Eastern Flank posture increasingly defined by immediate operational readiness and resilience against hybrid disruption, rather than long-term force planning alone.

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