Issue No 17 (17) 2025 – 25AUG – 02SEP2025

Executive Summary

Between 25–31AUG, the war in Ukraine remained defined by high-intensity attritional fighting, particularly across the Donbas and Kharkiv theatres. Russian forces conducted over 1,190 combat engagements, focusing on the Pokrovsk, Toretsk, and Kreminna axes. Despite advancing 5–30 sq km in select areas, these gains came at substantial cost, with some airborne and naval infantry brigades sustaining casualty rates exceeding 70–80%. Ukrainian forces preserved cohesion through tactical counterattacks, particularly at Myrne, Zelenyi Hai, and Volodymyrivka, recovering roughly 60 sq km in total. We assess Russia’s net territorial gain was some 450 sq km in August.

Strategically, Ukraine leveraged deep-strike drone and missile campaigns to target Russian refineries, depots, railway substations, and command nodes. Over 1,000 UAVs were launched during the week, disrupting Russian logistics by 10–20%, particularly in Bryansk, Rostov, and Krasnodar, and reducing fuel throughput in affected oblasts by up to 40%. These asymmetric strikes forced the reallocation of Russian air defences away from frontline zones and imposed new economic strains, contributing to rising internal fuel prices and refining shortfalls.

Operationally, Russia retains battlefield initiative through localised penetrations—most notably near Pokrovsk and Toretsk—using infiltration teams, motorcycles, and drone-enabled reconnaissance. However, Ukrainian kill-zone tactics, counterbattery fire, and expanding drone integration have checked deeper Russian advances, particularly in Lyman, Kupyansk, and Vovchansk. Ukrainian forces demonstrated growing competence in human–machine teaming, combined arms manoeuvre, and the adaptive use of terrain.

Politically, Kyiv’s diplomacy intensified following the Trump–Putin Alaska summit. President Zelenskyy secured USD 114 million from Switzerland and advanced discussions with Trump advisers, while warning against peace frameworks that entrench territorial loss. Despite Hungary’s veto of EU accession talks, Ukraine’s alignment with NATO deepened, with speculation around a 40-kilometre NATO-patrolled buffer zone gaining traction. However, public opinion revealed widening internal divides: 75% of Ukrainians back a ceasefire only if security guarantees are in place, while draft evasion and mobilisation resistance increased by an estimated 10%.

In Belarus, the reporting period was marked by an intensive cycle of preparations for Zapad-2025 and parallel CSTO drills. Multiple readiness inspections and battalion-level exercises were conducted across mechanised, artillery, and communications units, with reservists also engaged. Defence officials highlighted modern conflict lessons—including UAVs, EW, and robotic systems—at the opening of the CSTO’s Interaction, Search, and Echelon exercises. Diplomatic activity centred on President Alexander Lukashenko’s visit to China for the SCO summit, where he underlined Belarus’s alignment with multipolar initiatives and sought to deepen military-industrial cooperation. Meanwhile, reports of Russian troop redeployments into western Belarus remained unverified, though Russian UAVs violated Belarusian airspace on at least nine occasions. These dynamics underscore Belarus’s dual role as both an active training hub for allied militaries and a platform for hybrid signalling.

On NATO’s eastern flank, Allies sustained a high operational tempo of exercises and force development. Estonia advanced plans to spend more than 5% of GDP on defence in 2026–2029, with EU SAFE borrowing underpinning accelerated delivery of layered air defence, long-range strike, and ISR systems. Latvia launched Namejs 2025, its largest annual exercise, mobilising 12,000 troops and allied partners alongside significant civil-military integration drills, while Canada confirmed a three-year extension of its ~2,000-strong deployment under Operation REASSURANCE. Lithuania entered its most intensive training season of 2025 with the Thunderstorm series, involving 17,000 troops, and closed segments of its airspace near Belarus in response to repeated drone incursions. Poland reinforced its leadership role with new EU SAFE funding announcements and expanded cooperation with Sweden, while also highlighting vulnerabilities following the grounding of F-16 training flights after a fatal crash. Romania’s readiness was tested by the discovery and neutralisation of a sea mine on its Black Sea coast, reinforcing concerns about spill-over risks in the maritime domain. Collectively, these developments illustrate NATO’s determination to harden the eastern flank through expanded exercises, accelerated procurement, and stronger EU-NATO integration—yet also highlight the persistent risks of hybrid disruption and inadvertent escalation during the Zapad-2025 cycle.

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