Issue No 19 (19) 2025 – 08SEP – 16SEP2025

Executive Summary

The reporting period of 08–14SEP2025 reinforced the entrenched dynamics of a war of attrition in Ukraine, where Russia’s incremental battlefield gains remain strategically constrained, Ukraine’s deep-strike campaign continues to impose systemic costs, and the wider regional security environment is increasingly shaped by Belarus’s role as an enabler and NATO’s shift toward hard deterrence.

On the battlefield, Russian forces sustained offensive pressure across multiple axes, with the most notable advances recorded in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. Approximately 150 square kilometres were gained during the week, largely through the combined use of glide bombs, massed UAV swarms, and missile salvos that forced Ukrainian withdrawals from tactically exposed positions. Russia also pressed its effort around Kupyansk and Kreminna, though progress there was more limited. These advances underscore Moscow’s ability to generate localised momentum through sheer mass, yet they remain bounded by enduring structural constraints: overstretched logistics, the high rate of materiel attrition, and manpower fatigue resulting from sustained high-intensity combat. While Russian forces can advance the front line, their capacity to transform tactical successes into operational breakthroughs remains doubtful.

Ukraine’s response was to intensify its deep-strike campaign against the Russian rear. The reporting period saw a series of coordinated UAV and missile strikes against refineries, storage depots, and rail nodes in Bryansk, Rostov, and Krasnodar. These attacks forced throughput reductions of up to 40 per cent in certain regions and exposed the fragility of Russia’s domestic fuel balance, with independent petrol stations in several oblasts reporting shortages. Kyiv’s strategy is to stretch Russian sustainment timelines, erode economic confidence, and compel Moscow into costly rerouting of exports. This approach, however, is constrained by Ukraine’s ongoing manpower challenge: mobilisation targets remain unmet, reflecting both social resistance and battlefield casualties. At the same time, Ukraine’s defence industry continues to expand, with drone production reportedly up 20 per cent since July, underscoring the centrality of unmanned systems to Kyiv’s concept of operations. The net effect is a conflict environment defined by cumulative pressure: Russia advances incrementally but cannot overwhelm; Ukraine resists and disrupts but struggles to reverse momentum absent major new enablers.

Belarus remained central to the regional picture, with Zapad-2025 dominating the reporting period. Officially involving around 7,000 troops, including 1,000 Russians, the drills focused on UAV warfare, reconnaissance, and air defence, though Belarusian authorities highlighted planning for the use of the Oreshnik IRBM. Tensions with Poland sharpened as Warsaw closed its border indefinitely, while Minsk’s unusual cooperation in providing UAV flight data to Poland was likely intended as part of a broader deception effort coordinated with Russia. Politically, Lukashenko’s meeting with a U.S. envoy led to releasing 52 political prisoners and the lifting of sanctions on Belavia – the Belarusian flag carrier. At the same time, legislative amendments aligned Belarus’s military doctrine more closely with Russia’s Union State commitments.

NATO’s eastern posture was dominated by the unprecedented Russian drone incursions into Poland on 09–10SEP, which triggered Alliance air-to-air engagements and consultations under Article 4. In response, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia imposed temporary no-fly zones and airspace restrictions—up to 6,000 metres in depth—designed to simplify detection, improve response times, and enable counter-UAS operations during Zapad-2025. NATO announced Operation Eastern Sentry on 12SEP, deploying French, German, British, and Danish forces with anti-drone sensors and effectors across the entire eastern flank.

Exercise activity remained intense but shifted toward resilience and readiness in the context of Zapad. Latvia’s Namejs 2025 reached its midpoint with 12,000 troops rehearsing counter-mobility and hybrid defence scenarios, while Lithuania conducted Engineer Thunder and hosted the German-led Great Eagle 2025 redeployment of 2,000 Bundeswehr troops, testing strategic mobility. Romania, meanwhile, grappled with its own drone incursion on 13SEP, which exposed domestic debates over rules of engagement and underscored the credibility gap between Black Sea and Baltic air defence responses.

SAFE funding allocations are also moving from planning to implementation. Estonia (EUR 2.66 bn), Latvia (EUR 5.68 bn), Lithuania (EUR 6.38 bn), Poland (EUR 43.7 bn), and Romania (EUR 16.7 bn) each confirmed investment priorities in air defence, counter-UAS, artillery, and infrastructure modernisation. In total, these countries combine 50% of all funds to be allocated under the SAFE initiative. Collectively, SAFE has emerged as the backbone for anchoring long-term procurement into EU financial frameworks, ensuring multi-year contracts and industrial scaling in parallel with NATO’s deterrence posture.

Overall, the theatre remains characterised by three parallel dynamics: Russia’s ability to sustain tactical advances without achieving decisive operational results, Ukraine’s disruptive but resource-constrained strategy of deep strikes, and NATO’s consolidation of hard deterrence in response to hybrid provocations and direct drone violations. Belarus’s transformation into a Russian auxiliary compounds these trends, embedding Zapad-2025 as both a military rehearsal and a signalling tool. Strategic risk stems less from deliberate escalation than from the cumulative effect of attrition, hybrid provocations, and miscalculation as exercises, drone incursions, and no-fly zone enforcement overlap along NATO’s eastern frontier.

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