Executive Summary

The reporting period 22–30SEP2025 reinforced the attritional nature of the conflict in Ukraine, with both Russia and Ukraine sustaining intensive operations but achieving only limited territorial adjustments. The overall strategic picture remains characterised by a grinding stalemate, in which incremental Russian advances are offset by Ukraine’s capacity to impose costs through deep-strike campaigns against critical infrastructure and logistics nodes. This dual dynamic underscores the war’s transition into a long-term contest of endurance, with neither side positioned to achieve decisive operational breakthroughs in the near term.

Frontline Developments             
Russian forces registered net gains of approximately 60–90 km², primarily concentrated in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, with Pokrovsk, Kreminna, Toretsk, and Siversk emerging as focal points of sustained pressure. These advances were enabled by mass employment of FPV drones, glide bombs, and integration of Rubikon reconnaissance assets into Russia’s reconnaissance-fire complex. However, momentum was constrained by high attrition rates, with engagement ratios approaching 1:1, and by weather-induced mobility degradation of 20–30%, limiting the pace of offensive manoeuvre. Ukrainian counterattacks, though more limited in scale, successfully reclaimed 15–20 km², blunting Russian efforts to achieve larger breakthroughs. Daily combat intensity remained elevated at 150–200 engagements, further entrenching both sides in positional warfare.

Ukrainian Deep-Strike Campaign
Ukraine expanded its long-range strike operations, employing an estimated 600 UAVs and missiles on 27–28SEP alone. Strikes targeted oil refineries (Saratov, Samara, Volgograd, Salavat), rail junctions, and critical energy infrastructure. These attacks disrupted 10–15% of regional logistics throughput, forced the temporary suspension of over 2 million barrels per day of oil exports from Black Sea ports, and imposed mounting economic and political costs on Russia. Ukrainian employment of FPV drone swarms and Neptune anti-ship missile strikes demonstrated adaptation and innovation, straining Russian air defences and forcing the diversion of repair assets. While these operations have not translated into territorial reversals, they have exacerbated systemic vulnerabilities within Russia’s war economy and reduced its flexibility to sustain prolonged high-intensity operations.

Strategic and Theatre-Level Dynamics  
At the theatre level, the Russian Armed Forces are attempting to offset manpower and logistics strains through intensified drone and glide bomb usage, which has proved effective in creating localised tactical advantages but is insufficient to alter the strategic balance. Ukrainian forces, conversely, are leveraging asymmetric capabilities to impose costs on Russia’s operational depth, compensating for their own manpower and equipment shortages. This interplay has solidified a strategic equilibrium: Russia retains the initiative on the ground, but its capacity to exploit advances remains sharply constrained, while Ukraine demonstrates continued ability to contest the battlespace through strikes and counterattacks.

Belarus: Military activities and hybrid threats   
Belarus remained an active but secondary theatre during the reporting period. President Alexander Lukashenko’s visit to Russia on 25–26SEP centred on energy cooperation, the ongoing deployment of Oreshnik missile systems, and coordination with President Putin on Ukraine. Politically, Lukashenko reiterated calls for negotiations—including a trilateral format with Belarus—and praised U.S. President Trump’s potential role in peace efforts. His rhetoric contrasted with Poland’s warning to its citizens to leave Belarus amid rising tensions and arbitrary arrests.

Training activity of the Belarusian Armed Forces remained routine, with units engaged in seasonal post-Zapad maintenance and regular firing drills.

From a hybrid perspective, Russian UAV use of Belarusian airspace resumed after a two-week pause, with at least four incursions registered on 30SEP. Belarusian railways also facilitated the transfer of ammunition stocks to Russia, with over 60 wagons moved from domestic arsenals to support Russian operations. These developments highlight Belarus’s continued role as a logistical and political enabler of Russia’s war effort, even as its own military activity remains limited to standard exercises and international engagements.

Eastern Flank Developments    
NATO’s deterrence posture sharpened further during the period, shaped by Russian airspace violations and UAV incursions. On 19SEP, three Russian MiG-31s intruded into Estonian airspace for nearly 12 minutes, prompting the most serious manned-aircraft violation since 2014 and triggering Estonia’s second Article 4 consultation in two weeks. Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania maintained temporary no-fly zones and adjusted rules of engagement, while NATO’s Operation Eastern Sentry continued to deploy French, German, British, and Danish counter-UAS and air defence assets across the eastern flank.

Exercise activity reinforced this forward deterrence. Poland conducted Gotland Sentry (24–26SEP), the first bilateral SNEX with Sweden, projecting the 6th Airborne Brigade and Naval Missile Unit to the island to validate rapid reinforcement of the Baltic Sea terrain. Warsaw also inaugurated a new aviation fuel hub at Powidz to support U.S. pre-positioning under APS-2, and signed new air defence cooperation agreements with Norway. Latvia mobilised 12,000 troops for Namejs-2025, focusing on counter-mobility and hybrid defence. Lithuania hosted Engineer Thunder and the German-led Great Eagle 2025, validating brigade-level deployment timelines. Meanwhile, Romania began preparations for Dacian Fall 2025, with 2,400 French troops already augmenting the NATO battlegroup at Cincu, and announced a EUR 6.5 billion domestic main battle tank programme (216 units) to revitalise its armoured-industrial base.

Collectively, these measures underscore NATO’s shift from reassurance to a forward-deployed buffer capable of denying adversary freedom of manoeuvre in both the air and maritime domains. However, the durability of this posture remains contingent on sustaining political cohesion amid U.S. policy uncertainty and fiscal stress in several frontline states.

Forecasting and Risk Assessment
Looking ahead into early October, three trajectories are assessed:

• Most Likely (65–70%) – Russian forces secure limited weekly gains of 40–70 km² across Donetsk and Luhansk, but remain constrained by attrition, logistics, and worsening weather. Ukrainian counterstrikes hold attrition near parity, sustaining stalemate conditions.
• Best Case for Ukraine (10–20%) – Ukrainian counterattacks around Pokrovsk and Kreminna regain 10–15 km², stabilising the line and reinforcing morale. Expanded deep-strike activity further undermines Russia’s war economy and complicates its operational tempo.
• Worst Case (10–20%) – Russian advances around Pokrovsk and Siversk achieve breakthroughs, potentially creating encirclement risks and generating weekly gains of up to 70 km². Such outcomes would exacerbate Ukraine’s manpower and logistics vulnerabilities ahead of winter.

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