Report V – Russian Options in the Donetsk Direction – The Avdiivka axis (Free access)

Executive summary

Russians have been attempting to breach Ukrainian defensive lines near Avdiivka for the past two weeks. However, these efforts have yielded minimal results. In fact, the frontline in this area has remained almost frozen for more than a year [Map 1].

Map 1. Frontline changes in the Donetsk Direction, Avdiivka axis (Source: Rochan Consulting)

 

We propose viewing Avdiivka as a part of the battlefield that serves as a blocking line for both Ukraine’s continued defence and Russia’s potential operational setback in the event of a failure in this area, which could have significant consequences at the turn of winter into the coming spring.

Assessment of the area of operation: the Donetsk Direction – the Avdiivka axis

The operational area encompasses two Key Areas, the maintenance of which provides advantages for for sides.

These areas include:

  • Key Area 1 – SLAG HEAP
  • Key Area 2 – SEVERE VILLAGE

The control over these areas could determine the success or failure of defensive Ukrainian operations and/or offensive Russian actions.

For the purposes of this analysis, we also took into account such elements of the terrain as [Map 2]:

  • roads [M-04];
  • railways [Yasinovata-Donetsk railway];
  • river reservoirs [Durna River and others];
  • vegetation areas; and
  • settlements as built-up areas.

All these factors shape activities in the area of operations (AOO).

The first Key Area, the Slag Heap, is 30 m tall. Its height allows the placement of observers and reconnaissance technical means to reconnoitre neighbouring areas.

The Key Area 2 – Sievierne village allows Ukrainian forces to control logistic supply lines for the first echelon forces fighting in Avdiivka.

Therefore, controlling these two areas is key from a tactical point of view, but its loss/capture could also have operational consequences.

For Russian forces, controlling Key Areas 1 and 2 means achieving freedom of movement on the M-04 road and the Yasinovata-Donetsk railway. It will also ease up Russian logistics hurdles in the Donetsk and the Zaporozhina Directions.

Map 2. AOO Terrain conditions (Source: Rochan Consulting)

Composition of forces

To present a fuller picture of the current combat environment, below is the list [Map 3] of units on both sides deployed in the Donetsk Direction – the Avdiivka Axis as of 23OCT. The list is not exclusive; we also attach medium confidence to this data.

Indeed, there are gaps, especially about Russian units deployed in the area. As such, the list should be treated as writing carved in stone, but instead, it should provide the reader with a bit of context in which current events are occurring.

Ukrainian Armed Forces grouping in this axis consists of:

1st Echelon

  • 110th Motor Rifle Brigade (MRB)
  • 53rd MRB
  • 3rd Special Operations Forces (SOF) Regiment (Reg)
  • OMEGA SOF platoon
  • 6th Motor Rifle (MR) battalion
  • Other unknown units

2nd Echelon

  • no data

Support

  • no data

Russian Armed Forces grouping in this axis consists of:

1st Echelon

  • 114th MRB
  • 1545th Motor Rifle Regiment (MRR)
  • 255th MRR
  • 1231st MRR
  • 1232nd MRR
  • 1234th MRR
  • 21st MRB
  • 30th MRB
  • 15th MRB
  • PYATNASHKA MRB
  • 87th MRR
  • 33rd MRR
  • 1439th MRR
  • 1004th MRR
  • 1st MRB
  • 9th NIB

2nd Echelon

  • 4th A. NEVSKY Tank Battalion
  • Sparta Battalion
  • 1st SOMALIA TB
  • other unknown units

Reserve

  • 109th MRR
  • 1453rd MRR

Combat support

  • The Artillery of the 1st AC?

Map 3. Composition of forces (Source: Rochan Consulting)

Possible Russian Course of Action [COA] in the Donetsk Direction – the Avdiivka axis

Objective

Restore highway [M-04] and rail traffic on the Yasinovata-Donetsk railway line and thus improve offensive positions before the winter.

Implementation

Considering the terrain conditions and the Russian order of battle in the Avdiivka Axis, the Russian COA could consist of two stages [Map 4]:

STAGE I

Objective: cut Ukrainian logistic supply lines to Avdiivka

It is highly likely that during STAGE I [ongoing], Russian forces are trying to capture KEY AREAS 1 and 2. Indeed, Russians attempted flanking manoeuvres while simultaneously attacking the Slag Heap. Neither area has been captured.

STAGE II

Aim: circle and destroy Ukrainian forces in Avdiivka.

The Ukrainian logistic supply system for Avdiivka will be significantly degraded if  KEY AREA 1 and KEY AREA 2 are captured.

Thus, the Russians can resume logistical transports along the M-04 route and restart the Yasinovata-Donetsk railway line, which is not operational now. Without a properly functioning logistic system, the Russian ability to sustain its forces in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts may face some hurdles during the upcoming winter.

Map 4. Possible COA [scheme of manoeuvre] of Russian forces (Source: Rochan Consulting)

Map 5. Key Area 1 as the object of the attack (Source: Rochan Consulting)

Conclusions

  • Based on open-sources reports, we assess that up to now, Russian forces have put in battle at least three battalions [ including at least two regiments] to capture KEY AREAS 1 and 2 and took heavy losses.
  • The high importance of this region for the proper functioning of the Russian logistics system allows us to assume that it is almost certain that further attacks will be continued.
  • Given the number of introduced formations, the scale of the current losses, and marginal gains, we assess that Russians will not be able to advance without introducing more units into the fight;
  • Indeed, open sources indicated that the following units had been deployed to the region: 1231st MRR, 1232nd MRR, 1234th MRR, 15th MRB, 21st MRB, and 30th MRB;
  • On the Avdiivka axis, Russians can still coordinate actions involving the potential of two manoeuvre regiments attacking from different directions to achieve previously set joint objectives.

Set of terms

In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we use a set of terms proposed by the US Intelligence Community.