Executive Summary

• Ukraine advanced corps-level reforms with the establishment of the 12th and 19th Army Corps, but unit dispersion and interagency overlap continue to hinder cohesion. Tactical operations in Tetkino and Lyptsi showcased ZSU agility but exposed sustainment and coordination gaps.
• Strategic strikes intensified, with Ukraine targeting Russian defence-industrial sites and airbases, while Russia escalated Shahed drone attacks on Ukraine’s energy grid. Both campaigns had limited decisive impact but reflected increasing multi-domain integration.
• Russian forces made incremental gains around Toretsk, Lyman, and Sumy, applying FPV drones, light vehicles, and layered infantry tactics. A failed Ukrainian mechanised counterattack in Toretsk underscored persistent challenges in coordinated offensive action.
• Ukraine’s air defence remains critically depleted, raising risks to infrastructure and nuclear safety. Western aid—including 100 Patriot missiles from Germany—and domestic innovation (e.g., “Spider” ground robot) aim to plug capability gaps.
• Russia’s defence industry maintains wartime output, buoyed by North Korean ammunition supplies, but broader economic fragility persists. Labour shortages and uneven wage growth highlight structural strains across the civilian economy.
• Belarus aligned further with Moscow through joint commemorations and UAV regulation reforms, while military activity remained low during Victory Day.
• NATO’s eastern flank consolidated deterrence strategies. Estonia’s Siil 2025 and Poland’s East Shield operationalised Ukraine war lessons, while Latvia and Estonia’s Ottawa Convention withdrawal signals doctrinal hardening. Romania’s direction under President-elect Simion remains uncertain.

Regional overview

During the reporting period (07–13MAY2025), the Ukraine war continued to exhibit high-intensity, attritional dynamics, marked by evolving strike campaigns, tactical adaptation, and accelerating reforms on both sides.

Ukraine advanced its corps-level reform with the formal establishment of the 12th and 19th Army Corps, though force cohesion is challenged by interagency overlap and unit dispersion. Tactical offensives in the Tetkino and Lyptsi regions demonstrated Ukraine’s ability to conduct complex, cross-border and forest-clearing operations, albeit with high attrition and limited operational payoff. A failed mechanised counterattack in Toretsk underscored continued Ukrainian challenges in breaking fortified Russian positions. Nevertheless, Ukraine’s strategic strike campaign intensified with deep UAV raids against Russian airbases and defence-industrial sites, targeting facilities from Tula to Saransk and airfields near Moscow. These efforts inflicted moderate damage but were largely constrained by Russia’s layered air defences.

Russia maintained offensive momentum in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, with the 8th and 20th Combined Arms Armies (CAA) executing limited but cumulative advances near Toretsk, Kostyantynivka, and Lyman. Light mobile platforms, FPV drones, and artillery remain central to Russian assault doctrine. The activation of Operational Group Kursk and the deepening use of airborne and Spetsnaz units reflect Moscow’s push to stretch Ukrainian lines across Sumy and Kharkiv. While Russian strategic strikes degraded Ukrainian energy and logistics nodes—particularly near Zaporizhzhia NPP—the campaign failed to achieve decisive effects. Industrial output remains stable, supported by North Korean artillery imports, though broader structural economic weaknesses persist.

Belarus maintained a low operational tempo during Victory Day commemorations, with no significant changes to Russian force posture. However, the introduction of new UAV regulations and continued hosting of Vietnamese defence officials signal a widening of internal control mechanisms and efforts to diversify international partnerships. Belarusian exercises remained limited to small-unit training and reservist inspections.

NATO’s eastern flank demonstrated continued alignment with Ukraine’s defensive logic. Estonia’s Siil 2025 exercise, featuring over 16,000 troops, tested multi-domain mobilisation and validated Estonia’s 5.4% GDP defence posture. Poland’s East Shield and renewed defence cooperation with France reflect the strategic anchoring of territorial defence. Latvia and Estonia’s withdrawal from the Ottawa Convention suggests a doctrinal shift toward layered deterrence. Romania, while maintaining operational commitments, faces potential uncertainty under President-elect Simion, whose policy trajectory could influence NATO-Ukraine dynamics in the Black Sea.

Strategic risk indicators include critical depletion of Ukraine’s air defences—particularly Patriot missile stocks—and a looming debt default. These factors may constrain Kyiv’s strategic autonomy. Meanwhile, Russia’s ability to sustain operations into 2026 hinges on avoiding new sanctions and maintaining external military-technical support. The war’s trajectory is increasingly defined by synchronisation gaps—between adaptation and resource flow, domestic reform and battlefield tempo, and alliance cohesion versus political divergence.

Strategic implications

This week’s developments reaffirm our earlier assessment: Ukraine and Russia remain locked in a war shaped by structural adaptation, operational attrition, and diverging timelines. However, several trends point to a further narrowing of Ukraine’s operational margin—particularly in terms of air defence resilience, offensive capacity, and economic flexibility.

Ukraine’s corps-level restructuring continues apace, with the establishment of the 12th and 19th Army Corps marking a formal expansion of the decentralised command model. Yet, as previously assessed, the corps system remains organisationally fragmented. Unit dispersion across multiple ministries and operational fronts limits cohesion, while overlapping chains of command between the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Ministry of Internal Affairs constrain responsiveness. The new corps remain structurally ambitious but operationally incomplete without a functional reserve or surge mechanism.

Russia, meanwhile, has doubled down on economy-of-force tactics across key axes—Toretsk, Sumy, and Lyman—employing light motorised platforms, FPV drones, and small-unit coordination to probe Ukrainian lines. These tactics reflect a maturing adaptation to battlefield transparency and strike lethality. The formalisation of Operational Group Kursk and Russian pressure along the northern border continue to stretch Ukrainian defences, validating earlier projections that Moscow is seeking to complicate Ukraine’s reorganisation through geographic overstretch and tempo acceleration.

Ukrainian precision strikes—particularly the UAV and naval drone attacks on Russian defence-industrial and airbase targets—highlight Kyiv’s increasing proficiency in multi-domain operations. However, this capability is not without constraints. Strike effectiveness was moderate, as Russian air defences proved adaptive ahead of 09MAY celebrations. Sustaining these operations will require not only ISR and long-range munition access but also the industrial capacity to replace downed systems—areas where Ukraine remains dependent on Western pipelines.

Strategic risks for Ukraine are mounting. Patriot air defence stocks are nearing depletion, and despite a new German commitment of 100 interceptors, broader NATO resupply remains sluggish. Russian strategic strikes—especially on Ukraine’s energy grid and power transmission infrastructure—are increasingly threatening the safe operation of nuclear facilities. The temporary disconnection of Zaporizhzhia NPP from external power sources serves as a stark reminder of the conflict’s latent radiological risks.

Ukraine’s macroeconomic picture remains a critical vulnerability. While international reserves reached a record high in early May, the sovereign debt burden and long-term viability of Western financial support—particularly from the U.S.—remain uncertain. The newly ratified U.S.–Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund may offer long-term promise but is unlikely to produce immediate economic or strategic dividends.

On the Russian side, stable defence-industrial output—supported by North Korean munitions and internal labour shifts—continues to underpin military operations. Yet, as previously noted, structural imbalances persist. Civilian sectors are being hollowed out, labour shortages are intensifying, and productivity remains stagnant. These trends suggest that while Russia can sustain the current war tempo into 2025, any further escalation or sanctions regime—particularly one targeting oil and gas—could destabilise internal cohesion and procurement reliability by 2026.

Across NATO’s eastern flank, defence transformation is accelerating. Estonia’s Siil 2025 demonstrated credible mobilisation of over 16,000 personnel, including NATO allies, while Poland’s East Shield exercise reflects continued entrenchment of layered territorial defence. The Baltic states’ withdrawal from the Ottawa Convention signals an emergent doctrine of persistent deterrence built on the use of mines, dispersed fires, and hard infrastructure.

However, Romania’s trajectory remains uncertain. President-elect Simion has yet to articulate a clear position on Ukraine or Black Sea security, raising concerns over alliance coherence in the southeastern theatre. Any softening of Romania’s support could open a gap that Russia may seek to exploit, particularly in the information and hybrid domain.

In sum, the regional security architecture is coalescing around a long-term confrontation model: hardened deterrence, fragmented escalation management, and hybrid friction at multiple seams. Yet the system remains vulnerable—to Ukrainian frontline instability, Western lack of resolve, and battlefield asymmetries. Strategic success will rest not on immediate territorial shifts but on the continued synchronisation of Ukraine’s military adaptation, Western material support, and regional political cohesion.

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