Executive Summary

• Ukraine advanced its corps-level reform, assigning areas of responsibility to newly formed headquarters, though staffing and training gaps persist. Decentralised strike coordination—especially in Crimea and Belgorod—continues to evolve, with multi-domain drone operations now integrated into strategic planning. Cross-border raids near Tetkino highlight Kyiv’s efforts to force Russians to spread their forces;
• Russia maintained pressure across multiple fronts, with concentrated activity in Lyman, Pokrovsk, Toretsk, and Sumy. Light platforms (motorcycles, scooters) and FPV-intensive tactics signal doctrinal adaptation. The formalisation of OG Kursk suggests a renewed push into Sumy; VDV and Marines may reinforce Donetsk-Luhansk axes.
• Ukrainian air defence is at critical depletion levels, with Patriot systems nearly exhausted. AD coverage gaps are growing, particularly over strategic infrastructure. Germany, Israel, and Greece remain key to bridging this gap. Domestic artillery production (e.g., Bohdana SPG) is expanding, but timelines remain tight.
• Ukrainian strategic strike capability is growing, with increasing frequency and complexity of drone and naval UAV attacks on Russian airbases, logistics hubs, and energy infrastructure. Crimea remains a key focus as Ukraine seeks to degrade Russian operational depth.
• Russian recruitment continues at scale, potentially exceeding 40,000 per month. Defence-industrial output remains robust, supporting high operational tempo despite significant attrition. However, broader economic indicators point to stagnation or contraction by year’s end.
• Russian Ministry of Economic Development’s high-risk scenario anticipates Urals oil at USD 49, 2025 inflation at 8.2%, and GDP growth below 1.8%. Falling oil revenues and a stronger rouble have tripled the projected federal budget deficit. Defence spending remains shielded, but civilian purchasing power is rapidly weakening.
• Russia’s refusal to engage in negotiations with the US or Ukraine could trigger a new wave of Western sanctions, especially targeting oil and gas. This would further erode Moscow’s economic base and challenge its capacity to sustain warfighting into 2026.
• Belarus initiated annual reserve officer conscription, advanced defence ties with Russia through high-level participation in the Anti-Fascist Congress, and supported another Russo-Ukrainian POW exchange; limited military activity reflected ongoing parade preparations, while unconfirmed reports of Russian air defence withdrawals suggest shifting priorities ahead of Victory Day—no Wagner activity observed.
• Romania, the Baltic States, and Poland are consolidating deterrence strategies, reflecting Ukraine’s war lessons in doctrine, infrastructure, and force posture. Estonia’s Siil 2025 exercise and Poland’s East Shield are anchoring territorial defence readiness while Romania braces for a potential policy shift under President-elect George Simion. Despite growing alignment with NATO’s forward defence model, domestic political dynamics in Bucharest could influence future support to Ukraine.

Regional overview

The regional security environment in Eastern Europe remains tense and increasingly complex, shaped by Ukraine’s structural military reforms, sustained Russian pressure along multiple axes, and accelerating NATO defence transformation. The early days of May saw further signs of adaptation on both sides of the frontline amid deepening economic vulnerabilities and continued hybrid threats across the broader region.

In Ukraine, corps-level military reform entered a critical phase. Kyiv moved to assign areas of responsibility to newly formed headquarters, especially within its air assault and mechanised structures, reflecting an ongoing effort to transition toward decentralised, corps-led operations. However, this structural reorganisation continues to suffer from understaffing and limited training throughput. While no major redeployments have occurred, Ukrainian special forces and drone strike units have increasingly integrated with corps-level planning—particularly in the context of expanding multi-domain strike campaigns into occupied Crimea and Russia’s border regions.

Operationally, the battlefield remains defined by a grinding war of attrition. Russian forces intensified pressure along the Pokrovsk, Toretsk, and Sumy axes, with assaults leveraging light motorised platforms, FPV drones, and artillery saturation. These tactics, often enabled by real-time ISR, were met with adaptive Ukrainian responses—including the use of integrated drone–artillery kill chains and cross-border raids into Russia near Tetkino aimed at disrupting rear-area operations. The Russian military’s formal establishment of the Operational Group of Forces Kursk and the reported use of North Korean volunteer “Storm” units highlight Moscow’s continued efforts to solidify control over the northern front and stretch Ukrainian defensive capacity.

Russia also sustained its strategic strike campaign with a high tempo of drone and missile attacks, focusing particularly on energy infrastructure and major urban centres such as Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Dnipro. While Ukrainian air defences intercepted many incoming threats, gaps have emerged—especially due to the near exhaustion of Patriot missile stocks. NATO partners are scrambling to plug these holes, with Germany, Israel, and Greece emerging as key potential donors of urgently needed systems.

Ukraine, for its part, continues to improve its capacity for deep strikes. Complex drone swarms and naval unmanned systems are now being used in coordinated attacks on Russian targets across Crimea, Belgorod, and the southern military districts. These strikes have inflicted notable damage on Russian logistics nodes, airbases, and critical infrastructure, signalling a growing maturity in Ukraine’s use of decentralised, long-range precision strike capabilities.

However, Ukraine’s economic situation remains precarious. The government has yet to resolve its USD 2.6 billion debt payment due in May, raising the risk of sovereign default. Energy security also looms as a major challenge, with winter gas import needs still unmet and infrastructure damage mounting. Compounding the issue, US military assistance is nearing depletion, particularly in air defence resupply and artillery shells. Although Ukraine’s domestic defence industry—highlighted by the Bohdana self-propelled gun programme—is ramping up production, the current tempo remains insufficient to fully offset declining Western aid.

In Belarus, the spring conscription cycle began with the signing of Decree No. 179, reinforcing officer ranks with select reservists. Politically, Minsk aligned itself more closely with Moscow as Defence Minister Khrenin attended Russia’s Anti-Fascist Congress, echoing Kremlin narratives on NATO and the West. While military activity remained limited due to Victory Day parade preparations, Belarus facilitated another Russo-Ukrainian POW exchange, underscoring its logistical relevance to Russian operations. Unconfirmed reports of Russian S-300/S-400 withdrawals from Belarus suggest shifting air defence priorities ahead of 9MAY parade, amid a continued decline in Shahed UAV overflights. Wagner activity remained absent.

Meanwhile, NATO’s eastern flank continues its strategic realignment. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland advanced major defence initiatives—both infrastructural and doctrinal. Estonia launched Siil 2025, NATO’s largest exercise in the region this year, and began implementing its historic 5.4% of GDP defence budget. Latvia and Estonia’s withdrawal from the Ottawa Convention signalled a new willingness to operationalise anti-personnel minefields in national defence planning. Poland pressed forward with East Shield, while also intensifying bilateral defence cooperation with France and Norway. Across all four countries, lessons drawn from Ukraine—particularly in drone warfare, counter-mobility, and dispersed air defence—are now being codified into national military planning.

Romania remains in political flux following George Simion’s presidential victory. While its military remains committed to NATO exercises and regional posture coordination, Simion’s political platform could signal a recalibration of Bucharest’s support for Ukraine. Strategic planners across the region are watching carefully for any shift in Romania’s stance on sanctions, arms transfers, or Black Sea security cooperation.

Taken together, these developments reflect a region in strategic transition. While Russia continues to generate pressure through attritional warfare, deep strikes, and hybrid influence, Ukraine is adapting its operational architecture under severe material strain. NATO’s front-line states, meanwhile, are rapidly transforming in anticipation of long-term confrontation—suggesting a consolidation of the East European security space around hardened deterrence, operational autonomy, and doctrinal realism.

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